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Message-ID: <009b01c47ef8$79029ca0$d4f0bb51@vegetabl3.org> From: advisories at corsaire.com (advisories) Subject: Corsaire Security Advisory - Sygate Enforcer unauthenticated broadcast issue -- Corsaire Security Advisory -- Title: Sygate Enforcer unauthenticated broadcast issue Date: 20.11.03 Application: Sygate Enforcer prior to 3.5MR1 Environment: Windows NT, 2000, 2003 Author: Martin O'Neal [martin.oneal@...saire.com] Audience: General distribution Reference: c031120-003 -- Scope -- The aim of this document is to clearly define an issue that exists with the Sygate Enforcer product [1] that will allow a remote attacker to pass broadcast traffic through the Enforcer prior to authentication. -- History -- Discovered: 20.11.03 (Martin O'Neal) Vendor notified: 14.01.04 Document released: 10.8.04 -- Overview -- Sygate Enforcers are described as [2] "network gateway devices that enforce host integrity at network access points". Architecturally they function as an authenticated, packet-filtering firewall device. The Enforcer interacts with the Sygate Security Agent (SAA [the personal firewall component]) product and limits access to protected networks/hosts to authenticated clients that comply with a predefined policy. In practise, the Enforcer does not limit broadcast traffic (both local- net and all-nets) from passing through prior to authentication, allowing hosts that are protected by the Enforcer to still be attacked. -- Recommendations -- The Enforcer product should be upgraded to a version that is not susceptible to this issue. If it is not possible to upgrade promptly, then it may be feasible to protect hosts that are not local to the Enforcer by reconfiguring router devices to not propagate broadcasts. -- Background -- This issue was discovered using a custom protocol analysis tool developed by Corsaire's security assessment team. This tool is not available publicly, but is an example of the specialist approach used by Corsaire's consultants as part of a commercial security assessment. To find out more about the cutting edge services provided by Corsaire simply visit our web site at http://www.corsaire.com -- CVE -- The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2004-0593 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardises names for security problems. -- References -- [1] http://www.sygate.com [2] http://www.sygate.com/products/universal_enforcement.htm -- Revision -- a. Initial release. -- Distribution -- This security advisory may be freely distributed, provided that it remains unaltered and in its original form. -- Disclaimer -- The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Corsaire accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. -- About Corsaire -- Corsaire are a leading information security consultancy, founded in 1997 in Guildford, Surrey, UK. Corsaire bring innovation, integrity and analytical rigour to every job, which means fast and dramatic security performance improvements. Our services centre on the delivery of information security planning, assessment, implementation, management and vulnerability research. A free guide to selecting a security assessment supplier is available at http://www.penetration-testing.com Copyright 2004 Corsaire Limited. All rights reserved.
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