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From: adamsc at (Chris Adams)
Subject: !SPAM! Automated ssh scanning

On Sat, 28 Aug 2004 00:40:32 +0200, Robert Jaroszuk <> wrote:
> I have checked today dist-upgraded debian sarge, with *default* kernel
> (2.4.18-bf2.4), and it is still *vulnerable* to do_brk, kmod, and
> ptrace exploits.
> This kernel seems to be *not* patched since 2002.

This raises a very good question - why are known-insecure kernels
still being officially distributed? If you use stable you'll get a
2002 binary if you chose "kernel-image-2.4.18-686" but a secure kernel
if you chose "kernel-image-2.4.18-1-686" instead - quite a difference
from a seeming insignificant version number change. It's hard to think
of a scenario where it wouldn't be preferable to pull the bad packages
or at least include a prominent "Your system has a major security
hole" warning and a suggestion that you install the patched kernel

This has definitely improved in sarge where you have the
"kernel-image-2.4-686" and "kernel-image-2.6-686" packages with
dependencies tracking the current kernel, making the easy choice the
secure one as well.


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