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Message-ID: <41669A74.8090209@xmcopartners.com>
From: fcharpen at xmcopartners.com (Frederic Charpentier)
Subject: Fw: Citibank reminder: please update your data

About Citibank Scam :
it's an phising attack based on GDI+ JPEG overflow.

The exploit JPEG is named Ducky.jpg, and is detected by some antivirus 
systems as Trojan.Ducky.

The message from CityBank is not textual, but an imagemap of an image 
that is made to look like text.
The image is called sushi.gif, and it is believed to be used in attempt 
to evade anti-spam systems that
are based purely on textual analysis. When the recipient clicks on the 
link within the imagemap, they are
redirected to 67.43.211.1871:87/cit/index.htm.

Upon clicking on the imagemap, the user is taken to a site to enter 
confidential information. The interesting part of this image entry 
dialog box is that it also opens a legitimate copy of the Citibank Web
site under the phishing dialog to further enhance its perceived 
legitimacy. The Window in the foreground is malicious and posts to 
verify.php on 67.182.134.119, while the window in the background is the 
legitimate homepage of Citibank.

The result of a successful compromise is the downloading and execution 
of ll.exe from maybeyes.biz. ll.exe is then saved to c:\y.exe and executed.
Upon execution, y.exe calls URLDownloadToFile() on 
http://www.maybeyes.biz/upd.exe.
This file is then saved as %SYSTEMROOT%\divxencoder.exe. When executed, 
divxencoder.exe will parse the system for the explorer.exe process for 
the purpose of injecting a DLL into its memory space.

When run, the DLL contacts 65.75.185.210 on ports 9348 and 9323 to 
download the XML configuration file that will be used as the basis for 
the phishing spam.

Frederic Charpentier

Pablo wrote:

> This hit me today.
> The URL is:
> http://%32%31%31%2E%39%37%2E%32%34%38%2E%36%30:%38%37/%63%69%74/%69%6E%64%65%78%2E%68%74%6D
> 
> ( http://211.97.248.60:87/cit/confirm.htm )
> 
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "CITI" <supprefnum2@...ibank.com>
> To: <paa-listas@...entina.com>
> Sent: Thursday, October 07, 2004 9:08 PM
> Subject: Citibank reminder: please update your data
> 
> 
> 
>>
>>in 1965 Surfing Love Stories in 1905 a When you in 1920 Vacation
> 
> Entertainment Everything please Andrea Thompson ANALYSIS NYTimes It's
> impossible no doubt Nintendo Have a good time So, if we.. Coyote Ugly that's
> a call for you Father's Day in 1955 Terra in 1850 X Men What area, please?
> 
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>

-- 
_______________________________________
Frederic Charpentier - Xmco Partners
Security Consulting / Pentest
web  : http://www.xmcopartners.com


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