full-disclosure - Re: Any update on SSH brute force attempts?

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Message-ID: <1098105865.7155.8.camel@www.bsrf.org.uk>
From: barrie at reboot-robot.net (Barrie Dempster)
Subject: Re: Any update on SSH brute force attempts?

On Mon, 2004-10-18 at 06:41 -0500, Ron DuFresne wrote:
> Why not just disallow root logins directly, and force someone with a valid
> user account to su after getting a shell?  It was my impression that was
> more standard, and if one has to allow remote root directly, at least
> restrict it to specific systems and users.  All the places I have worked
> for forced the su after shell to root..

I'm in agreement with this, as well as combining this with use of sudo
for common functions requiring root privs (such as using tools requiring
raw socks support for instance) meaning you rarely have to become root
and the root account becomes slightly more difficult to compromise.

-- 
Barrie Dempster (zeedo) - Fortiter et Strenue

  http://www.bsrf.org.uk

[ gpg --recv-keys --keyserver www.keyserver.net 0x96025FD0 ]
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