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Message-ID: <OpenPKG-SA-2004.049@openpkg.org>
From: openpkg at openpkg.org (OpenPKG)
Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2004.049] OpenPKG Security Advisory (gd)
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________________________________________________________________________
OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@...npkg.org openpkg@...npkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2004.049 30-Oct-2004
________________________________________________________________________
Package: gd
Vulnerability: denial of service, arbitrary code execution
OpenPKG Specific: no
Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= gd-2.0.28-20041001 >= gd-2.0.29-20041030
OpenPKG 2.2 <= gd-2.0.28-2.2.0 >= gd-2.0.28-2.2.1
OpenPKG 2.1 <= gd-2.0.27-2.1.1 >= gd-2.0.27-2.1.2
Affected Releases: Dependent Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT analog, apache::with_mod_php_gd, libwmf, mrtg,
nagios, perl-gd, php::with_gd, php3::with_gd,
php5::with_gd, webalizer, zimg
OpenPKG 2.2 analog, apache::with_mod_php_gd, libwmf, mrtg,
perl-gd, php::with_gd, webalizer
OpenPKG 2.1 analog, apache::with_mod_php_gd, libwmf,
perl-gd, php::with_gd, webalizer
Description:
In a BUGTRAQ posting [0], a vulnerability was reported for the
graphics library GD [1]. There can be an integer overflow when
allocating memory in the routine that handles loading of PNG image
files. This later leads to heap data structures being overwritten. If
an attacker tricked a user into loading a malicious PNG image, they
could leverage this into executing arbitrary code in the context of
the user opening the image. Similar integer overflow possibilities
also exist in other code parts of GD. The Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-0990 [2] to the
problem.
Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
rpm -q gd". If you have the "gd" package installed and its version is
affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see
Solution) and its dependent packages (see above), if any, too [3][4].
Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
binary RPM [4]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.2, perform the
following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
other releases adjust accordingly).
$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/2.2/UPD
ftp> get gd-2.0.28-2.2.1.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig gd-2.0.28-2.2.1.src.rpm
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild gd-2.0.28-2.2.1.src.rpm
$ su -
# <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/gd-2.0.28-2.2.1.*.rpm
Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall
all dependent packages (see above), if any, too [3][4].
________________________________________________________________________
References:
[0] http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/379382
[1] http://www.boutell.com/gd/
[2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0990
[3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/gd-2.0.28-2.2.1.src.rpm
[6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/gd-2.0.27-2.1.2.src.rpm
[7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
[8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/
[9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________
For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________
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