Message-ID: <200411080050.iA80oqCn022939@sys-s02.qmnsw>
From: psilo at spunge.org (Ben)
Subject: Blackbox: Elections fraud in 2004

See also.

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/1106-30.htm

> -----Original Message-----
> From: J.A. Terranson [mailto:measl@....org]
> Sent: Monday, 8 November 2004 9:09 AM
> To: antisocial@....org
> Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com; cypherpunks@...qaeda.net
> Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Blackbox: Elections fraud in 2004
> 
> 
> http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
> 
> BREAKING -- SUNDAY Nov. 7 2004: Freedom of Information requests at
> http://www.blackboxvoting.org have unearthed two Ciber certification
> reports indicating that security and tamperability was NOT TESTED and that
> several state elections directors, a secretary of state, and computer
> consultant Dr. Britain Williams signed off on the report anyway,
> certifying it.
> 
> Black Box Voting has taken the position that fraud took place in the 2004
> election through electronic voting machines. We base this on hard
> evidence, documents obtained in public records requests, inside
> information, and other data indicative of manipulation of electronic
> voting systems. What we do not know is the specific scope of the fraud. We
> are working now to compile the proof, based not on soft evidence -- red
> flags, exit polls -- but core documents obtained by Black Box Voting in
> the most massive Freedom of Information action in history.
> 
> -----------------------------------------------
> 
> SUNDAY Nov. 7 2004: We.re awaiting independent analysis on some pretty
> crooked-looking elections. In the mean time, here.s something to chew on.
> 
> Your local elections officials trusted a group called NASED -- the
> National Association of State Election Directors -- to certify that your
> voting system is safe.
> 
> This trust was breached.
> 
> NASED certified the systems based on the recommendation of an .Independent
> Testing Authority. (ITA).
> 
> What no one told local officials was that the ITA did not test for
> security (and NASED didn.t seem to mind).
> 
> The ITA reports are considered so secret that even the California
> Secretary of State.s office had trouble getting its hands on one. The ITA
> refused to answer any questions about what it does. Imagine our surprise
> when, due to Freedom of Information requests, a couple of them showed up
> in our mailbox.
> 
> The most important test on the ITA report is called the .penetration
> analysis.. This test is supposed to tell us whether anyone can break into
> the system to tamper with the votes.
> 
> .Not applicable,. wrote Shawn Southworth, of Ciber Labs, the ITA that
> tested the Diebold GEMS central tabulator software. .Did not test..
> 
> Shawn Southworth .tested. whether every candidate on the ballot has a
> name. But we were shocked to find out that, when asked the most important
> question -- about vulnerable entry points -- Southworth.s report says .not
> reviewed..
> 
>  Ciber .tested.whether the manual gives a description of the voting
> system. But when asked to identify methods of attack (which we think the
> American voter would consider pretty important), the top-secret report
> says .not applicable..
> 
> Ciber .tested. whether ballots comply with local regulations, but when Bev
> Harris asked Shawn Southworth what he thinks about Diebold tabulators
> accepting large numbers of .minus. votes, he said he didn.t mention that
> in his report because .the vendors don.t like him to put anything
> negative. in his report. After all, he said, he is paid by the vendors.
> 
> Shawn Southworth didn.t do the penetration analysis, but check out what he
> wrote:
> 
> .Ciber recommends to the NASED committee that GEMS software version
> 1.18.15 be certified and assigned NASED certification number
> N03060011815..
> 
> Was this just a one-time oversight?
> 
> Nope. It appears to be more like a habit. Here is the same Ciber
> certification section for VoteHere; as you can see, the critical security
> test, the .penetration analysis. was again marked .not applicable. and was
> not done.
> 
> Maybe another ITA did the penetration analysis?
> 
> Apparently not. We discovered an even more bizarre Wyle Laboratories
> report. In it, the lab admits the Sequoia voting system has problems, but
> says that since they were not corrected earlier, Sequoia could continue
> with the same flaws. At one point the Wyle report omits its testing
> altogether, hoping the vendor will do the test.
> 
> Computer Guys: Be your own ITA certifier.
> 
> Here is a copy of the full Ciber report (part 1, 2, 3, 4) on GEMS 1.18.15.
> Here is a zip file download for the GEMS 1.18.15 program. Here is a real
> live Diebold vote database. Compare your findings against the official
> testing lab and see if you agree with what Ciber says. E-mail us your
> findings.
> 
> TIPS: The password for the vote database is .password. and you should
> place it in the .LocalDB. directory in the GEMS folder, which you.ll find
> in .program files..
> 
> Who the heck is NASED?
> 
> They are the people who certified this stuff.
> 
> You.ve gotta ask yourself: Are they nuts? Some of them are computer
> experts. Well, it seems that several of these people suddenly want to
> retire, and the whole NASED voting systems board is becoming somewhat
> defunct, but these are the people responsible for today's shoddy voting
> systems.
> 
> If the security of the U.S. electoral system depends on you to certify a
> voting system, and you get a report that plainly states that security was
> .not tested. and .not applicable. -- what would you do?
> 
> Perhaps we should ask them. Go ahead. Let's hold them accountable for the
> election we just had. (Please, e-mail us their answers) They don't make it
> very easy to get their e-mail and fax information; when you find it, let
> us know and we'll post it here.
> 
> NASED VOTING SYSTEMS/ITA ACCREDITATION BOARD
> 
> Thomas R. Wilkey, Executive Director, New York State Board of Elections
> 
> David Elliott, (former) Asst. Director of Elections, Washington State
> 
> James Hendrix, Executive Director, State Election Commission, South
> Carolina
> 
> Denise Lamb, Director, State Bureau of Elections, New Mexico
> 
> Sandy Steinbach, Director of Elections, Iowa
> 
> Donetta Davidson, Secretary of State, Colorado
> 
> Connie Schmidt, Commissioner, Johnson County Election Commission, Kansas
> 
> (the late) Robert Naegele, President Granite Creek Technology, Pacific
> Grove, California
> 
> Brit Williams, Professor, CSIS Dept, Kennesaw State College, Georgia
> 
> Paul Craft, Computer Audit Analyst, Florida State Division of Elections
> Florida
> 
> Steve Freeman, Software Consultant, League City, Texas
> 
> Jay W. Nispel, Senior Principal Engineer, Computer Sciences Corporation
> Annapolis Junction, Maryland
> 
> Yvonne Smith (Member Emeritus), Former Assistant to the Executive Director
> Illinois State Board of Elections, Illinois
> 
> Penelope Bonsall, Director, Office of Election Administration, Federal
> Election Commission, Washington, D.C.
> 
> Committee Secretariat: The Election Center, R. Doug Lewis, Executive
> Director Houston, Texas, Tele: 281-293-0101
> 
> # # # # #
> 
> THURSDAY Nov. 4 2004: If you are concerned about what happened Tuesday,
> Nov. 2, you have found a home with our organization. Help America Audit.
> 
> Black Box Voting has taken the position that fraud took place in the 2004
> election through electronic voting machines. We base this on hard
> evidence, documents obtained in public records requests, inside
> information, and other data indicative of manipulation of electronic
> voting systems. What we do not know is the specific scope of the fraud. We
> are working now to compile the proof, based not on soft evidence -- red
> flags, exit polls -- but core documents obtained by Black Box Voting in
> the most massive Freedom of Information action in history.
> 
> We need: Lawyers to enforce public records laws. Some counties have
> already notified us that they plan to stonewall by delaying delivery of
> the records. We need citizen volunteers for a number of specific actions.
> We need computer security professionals willing to GO PUBLIC with formal
> opinions on the evidence we provide, whether or not it involves DMCA
> complications. We need funds to pay for copies of the evidence.
> 
> TUESDAY Nov 2 2004: BREAKING NEWS: New information indicates that hackers
> may have targeted the central computers that are counting our votes.
> 
> Freedom of Information requests are not free. We need to raise $50,000 as
> quickly as possible to pay for records and the fees some states charge for
> them. We launched one major FOIA action last night, and have two more on
> the way, pell-mell. Now is the time. If you can't donate funds, please
> donate time. E-mail to join the Cleanup Crew.
> 
> Important: Watch this 30-minute film clip
> Voting without auditing. (Are we insane?)
> 
> SEATTLE, WASHINGTON Nov 3 2004 -- Did the voting machines trump exit
> polls? There.s a way to find out.
> 
> Black Box Voting (.ORG) is conducting the largest Freedom of Information
> action in history. At 8:30 p.m. Election Night, Black Box Voting blanketed
> the U.S. with the first in a series of public records requests, to obtain
> internal computer logs and other documents from 3,000 individual counties
> and townships. Networks called the election before anyone bothered to
> perform even the most rudimentary audit.
> 
> America: We have permission to say No to unaudited voting. It is our
> right.
> 
> Among the first requests sent to counties (with all kinds of voting
> systems -- optical scan, touch-screen, and punch card) is a formal records
> request for internal audit logs, polling place results slips, modem
> transmission logs, and computer trouble slips.
> 
> An earlier FOIA is more sensitive, and has not been disclosed here. We
> will notify you as soon as we can go public with it.
> 
> Such a request filed in King County, Washington on Sept. 15, following the
> primary election six weeks ago, uncovered an internal audit log containing
> a three-hour deletion on election night; .trouble slips. revealing
> suspicious modem activity; and profound problems with security, including
> accidental disclosure of critically sensitive remote access information to
> poll workers, office personnel, and even, in a shocking blunder, to Black
> Box Voting activists.
> 
> Black Box Voting is a nonpartisan, nonprofit consumer protection group for
> elections. You may view the first volley of public records requests here:
> Freedom of Information requests here
> 
> Responses from public officials will be posted in the forum, is organized
> by state and county, so that any news organization or citizens group has
> access to the information. Black Box Voting will assist in analysis, by
> providing expertise in evaluating the records. Watch for the records
> online; Black Box Voting will be posting the results as they come in. And
> by the way, these are not free. The more donations we get, the more FOIAs
> we are empowered to do. Time's a'wasting.
> 
> We look forward to seeing you participate in this process. Join us in
> evaluating the previously undisclosed inside information about how our
> voting system works.
> 
> Play a part in reclaiming transparency. It.s the only way.
> 
> # # # # #
> 
> Public Records Request - November 2, 2004
> From: Black Box Voting
> To: Elections division
> 
> Pursuant to public records law and the spirit of fair, trustworthy,
> transparent elections, we request the following documents.
> 
> We are requesting these as a nonprofit, noncommercial group acting in the
> capacity of a news and consumer interest organization, and ask that if
> possible, the fees be waived for this request. If this is not possible,
> please let us know which records will be provided and the cost. Please
> provide records in electronic form, by e-mail, if possible -
> crew@...ckboxvoting.org.
> 
> We realize you are very, very busy with the elections canvass. To the
> extent possible, we do ask that you expedite this request, since we are
> conducting consumer audits and time is of the essence.
> 
> We request the following records.
> 
> Item 1. All notes, emails, memos, and other communications pertaining to
> any and all problems experienced with the voting system, ballots, voter
> registration, or any component of your elections process, beginning
> October 12, through November 3, 2004.
> 
> Item 2. Copies of the results slips from all polling places for the Nov.
> 2, 2004 election. If you have more than one copy, we would like the copy
> that is signed by your poll workers and/or election judges.
> 
> Item 3: The internal audit log for each of your Unity, GEMS, WinEds, Hart
> Intercivic or other central tabulating machine. Because different
> manufacturers call this program by different names, for purposes of
> clarification we mean the programs that tally the composite of votes from
> all locations.
> 
> Item 4: If you are in the special category of having Diebold equipment, or
> the VTS or GEMS tabulator, we request the following additional audit logs:
> 
> a. The transmission logs for all votes, whether sent by modem or uploaded
> directly. You will find these logs in the GEMS menu under .Accuvote OS
> Server. and/or .Accuvote TS Server.
> 
> b. The .audit log. referred to in Item 3 for Diebold is found in the GEMS
> menu and is called .Audit Log.
> 
> c. All .Poster logs.. These can be found in the GEMS menu under .poster.
> and also in the GEMS directory under Program Files, GEMS, Data, as a text
> file. Simply print this out and provide it.
> 
> d. Also in the Data file directory under Program Files, GEMS, Data, please
> provide any and all logs titled .CCLog,. .PosterLog., and Pserver Log, and
> any logs found within the .Download,. .Log,. .Poster. or .Results.
> directories.
> 
> e. We are also requesting the Election Night Statement of Votes Cast, as
> of the time you stopped uploading polling place memory cards for Nov. 2,
> 2004 election.
> 
> Item 5: We are requesting every iteration of every interim results report,
> from the time the polls close until 5 p.m. November 3.
> 
> Item 6: If you are in the special category of counties who have modems
> attached, whether or not they were used and whether or not they were
> turned on, we are requesting the following:
> 
> a. internal logs showing transmission times from each voting machine used
> in a polling place
> 
> b. The Windows Event Viewer log. You will find this in administrative
> tools, Event Viewer, and within that, print a copy of each log beginning
> October 12, 2004 through Nov. 3, 2004.
> 
> Item 7: All e-mails, letters, notes, and other correspondence between any
> employee of your elections division and any other person, pertaining to
> your voting system, any anomalies or problems with any component of the
> voting system, any written communications with vendors for any component
> of your voting system, and any records pertaining to upgrades,
> improvements, performance enhancement or any other changes to your voting
> system, between Oct. 12, 2004 and Nov. 3, 2004.
> 
> Item 8: So that we may efficiently clarify any questions pertaining to
> your specific county, please provide letterhead for the most recent
> non-confidential correspondence between your office and your county
> counsel, or, in lieu of this, just e-mail us the contact information for
> your county counsel.
> 
> Because time is of the essence, if you cannot provide all items, please
> provide them in increments as soon as you have them, and please notify us
> by telephone (206-335-7747) or email (Bevharrismail@....com) as soon as
> you have any portion of the above public records request available for
> review.
> 
> Thank you very much, and here.s hoping for a smooth and simple canvass
> which works out perfectly for you. We very, very much appreciate your help
> with this, and we do realize how stressful this election has been.
> 
> If you need a local address, please let me know, and we will provide a
> local member for this public records request. In the interest of keeping
> your life simple, we thought it best to coordinate all records through one
> entity so that you don.t get multiple local requests.
> 
> # # # # #
> 
> We now have evidence that certainly looks like altering a computerized
> voting system during a real election, and it happened just six weeks ago.
> 
> MONDAY Nov 1 2004: New information indicates that hackers may be targeting
> the central computers counting our votes tomorrow. All county elections
> officials who use modems to transfer votes from polling places to the
> central vote-counting server should disconnect the modems now.
> 
> There is no down side to removing the modems. Simply drive the vote
> cartridges from each polling place in to the central vote-counting
> location by car, instead of transmitting by modem. .Turning off. the
> modems may not be sufficient. Disconnect the central vote counting server
> from all modems, INCLUDING PHONE LINES, not just Internet.
> 
> In a very large county, this will add at most one hour to the
> vote-counting time, while offering significant protection from outside
> intrusion.
> 
> It appears that such an attack may already have taken place, in a primary
> election 6 weeks ago in King County, Washington -- a large jurisdiction
> with over one million registered voters. Documents, including internal
> audit logs for the central vote-counting computer, along with modem
> .trouble slips. consistent with hacker activity, show that the system may
> have been hacked on Sept. 14, 2004. Three hours is now missing from the
> vote-counting computer's "audit log," an automatically generated record,
> similar to the black box in an airplane, which registers certain kinds of
> events.
> 
> COMPUTER FOLKS:
> 
> Here are the details about remote access vulnerability through the modem
> connecting polling place voting machines with the central vote-counting
> server in each county elections office. This applies specifically to all
> Diebold systems (1,000 counties and townships), and may also apply to
> other vendors. The prudent course of action is to disconnect all modems,
> since the downside is small and the danger is significant.
> 
> The central servers are installed on unpatched, open Windows computers and
> use RAS (Remote Access Server) to connect to the voting machines through
> telephone lines. Since RAS is not adequately protected, anyone in the
> world, even terrorists, who can figure out the server's phone number can
> change vote totals without being detected by observers.
> 
> The passwords in many locations are easily guessed, and the access phone
> numbers can be learned through social engineering or war dialing.
> 
> ELECTION OFFICIALS: The only way to protect tomorrow's election from this
> type of attack is to disconnect the servers from the modems now. Under
> some configurations, attacks by remote access are possible even if the
> modem appears to be turned off. The modem lines should be physically
> disconnected.
> 
> We obtained these documents through a public records request. The video
> was taken at a press conference held by the King County elections chief
> Friday Oct 29.
> 
> The audit log is a computer-generated automatic record similar to the
> "black box" in an airplane, that automatically records access to the
> Diebold GEMS central tabulator (unless, of course, you go into it in the
> clandestine way we demonstrated on September 22 in Washington DC at the
> National Press club.)
> 
> The central tabulator audit log is an FEC-required security feature. The
> kinds of things it detects are the kinds of things you might see if
> someone was tampering with the votes: Opening the vote file, previewing
> and/or printing interim results, altering candidate definitions (a method
> that can be used to flip votes).
> 
> Three hours is missing altogether from the Sept. 14 Washington State
> primary held six weeks ago.
> 
> Here is a copy of the GEMS audit log.
> 
> Note that all entries from 9:52 p.m. until 1:31 a.m. are missing.
> 
> One report that GEMS automatically puts in the audit log is the "summary
> report." This is the interim results report. We obtained the actual Sept.
> 14 summary reports, printed directly from the King County tabulator GEMS
> program, because we went there and watched on election night and collected
> these reports. These reports were also collected by party observers,
> candidates, and were on the Web site for King County.
> 
> Here are summary reports which are now missing from the audit log.
> 
> Note the time and date stamps on the reports. Note also that they are
> signed by Dean Logan, King County elections chief. We have the original
> reports signed in ink on election night.
> 
> What does all this mean?
> 
> We know that summary reports show up in the audit log.
> 
> There are other audit logs, like the one that tracks modem transmissions,
> but this audit log tracks summary reports.
> 
> Dean Logan held a press conference Friday morning, Oct. 29. Kathleen
> Wynne, a citizen investigator for Black Box Voting, attended the press
> conference and asked Dean Logan why three hours are missing from the audit
> log.
> 
> Here is a video clip
> 
> Logan said the empty three hours is because no reports were printed. OK.
> But we have summary reports from 10:34 p.m., 11:38 p.m., 12:11 a.m., 12:46
> a.m., and 1:33 p.m. These reports were during the time he said no reports
> were run. Either the software malfunctioned, or audit log items were
> deleted. Because remote access through the modems is possible, the system
> may have been hacked, audit log deleted, without Logan realizing it.
> 
> Perhaps there are two of this particular kind of audit log? Perhaps this
> is an incomplete one?
> 
> Bev Harris called King County elections office records employee Mary Stoa,
> asking if perhaps there are any other audit logs at all. Mary Stoa called
> back, reporting that according to Bill Huennikens of King County
> elections, the audit log supplied to us in our public records request is
> the only one and the comprehensive and complete one.
> 
> Perhaps it is a computer glitch?
> 
> The audit log is 168 pages long and spans 120 days, and the 3 hours just
> happen to be missing during the most critical three hours on election
> night.
> 
> Diebold says altering the audit log cannot be done. Of course, we know a
> chimpanzee can't get into an elections office and play with the computer,
> but to demonstrate how easy it is to delete audit log entries, we taught a
> chimpanzee to delete audit records using an illicit "back door" to get
> into the program, Diebold told reporters it was a "magic show." Yet,
> Diebold's own internal memos show they have known the audit log could be
> altered since 2001!
> 
> Here is a Diebold memo from October 2001, titled "Altering the audit log,"
> written by Diebold principal engineer Ken Clark:
> 
> "King County is famous for it" [altering the audit log]
> 
> Here is Dean Logan, telling a Channel 5 King-TV News reporter that there
> were no unexpected problems with the Diebold programs. This was at the
> "MBOS" central ballot counting facility in King County in the wee hours of
> Sept. 15, on Election Night.
> 
> Dean Logan on Election Night, Sept 14 2004
> 
> Note that he says there were no problems with modem transmission.
> 
> When we obtained the trouble slips, in a public records request --
> documentation that indeed the modems were not working fine, we were
> accidentally given the access phone number for King County.
> 
> Were we so inclined, if we had simply kept this under our hat, we could
> take control of your central server on election night from our living
> room.
> 
> Here are the trouble slips showing problems with modems. Note that King
> County generously provided us with the "secret" information needed to hack
> in by remote access. We did redact the specific information that gives
> this information to you.
> 
> Here are more trouble tickets. One that is a concern: "OK to format memory
> card?" (This would wipe out the votes in the electronic ballot box.)
> 
> Election officials: Disconnect those modems NOW. If you don't: You gotta
> be replaced.
> Reporters: Some election officials will lie to you. Show your kids what
> bravery looks like. Be courageous. Report the truth.
> Citizens: Please help us by joining the Cleanup Crew. For now, e-mail
> crew@...ckboxvoting.org to join, since our signup form has been taken out.
> Candidates: Make a statement. Do not concede on Election Night. Wait until
> audits and records can be examined.
> 
> # # # # #
> 
> HOW TO MONITOR THE CENTRAL TABULATOR: Black Box Voting developed these
> guidelines to help you create an audit log, which can then be compared
> with the FEC-required computer-generated audit log inside the computer.
> 
> Yes, this is a lot of stuff, and it might feel overwhelming, but whatever
> you can do -- it is very much appreciated.
> 
> THINGS TO BRING WITH YOU
> - A notebook and pen. Preferably a notebook with a sewn binding, if you
> can find one. Do not take notes on a computer.
> - A cell phone
> - Binoculars
> If you can, also bring these:
> - A camera
> - A small tape recorder
> - A video camera, with a zoom lens if possible
> 
> Note that some counties will require you to turn off your video camera
> during the entering of passwords, a valid request. You should, however, be
> able to videotape the rest. Don.t pull your camera out right away. Avoid
> confrontation by leaving your video camera in the bag -- better yet, a
> purse. Pull it out only when there is an event of significance.
> 
> HUMAN FACTORS
> 
> You can.t be effective if you make assumptions or let others intimidate
> you.
> - Don.t let others make you feel dumb.
> - Make no assumptions about security. It might be worse than you expect.
> - Don.t count on the accuracy of anything other people tell you, even if
> they work for the county or the vendor.
> - About party observers, techies, or lawyers: Remember that they have not
> examined the actual software or setup, and they are operating on
> assumptions, hearsay, or in some cases, may be trying to misdirect your
> attention.
> - Vendor contracts prohibit county officials from examining their own
> software. Elections officials may just be repeating what someone else (the
> vendor) has told them.
> 
> YOUR ROLE AS AN OBSERVER: CREATE YOUR OWN AUDIT LOG so it can be compared
> to the real audit log.
> 
> Write down the following. For every event, write the date, time, including
> minutes.
> 
> 1. NAMES & AFFILIATIONS: Get the names of everyone there. Find out
> affiliation.
> 
> 2. WHERE ARE THE COMPUTERS: Establish the number and location of all vote
> tabulation computers. They call them different things: tabulators,
> servers. What you want is the computer that adds up all the votes from
> everywhere in the county.
> - Some counties have only one. If there are more than one, find out where
> each one is. If there is more than one tabulator, ask if they are
> networked together and find out if any of them are in places you can.t
> observe.
> 
> 3. SYNCHRONIZE YOUR WATCH with the central vote-tally computer. Ask
> officials to tell you the time on the computer. If more than one, ask for
> the time of each and the ID number of each.
> 
> log the date and time, to the minute, in this format:
> Nov 02 2004 11:25 p.m.
> Nov. 03 2004 01:15 a.m.
> 
> CREATE A LOG FOR THE FOLLOWING:
> 
> People: Ask names and affiliations for, and log the START and STOP time
> for:
> 
> a. Who accesses the terminal (the keyboard and screen)
> b. Who sits at the terminal
> c. Who accesses the server (the computer the screen is hooked up to)
> d. Who enters and leaves the room
> 
> COMPUTER ACTIVITIES: Log the START and STOP time for the following events
> and write down the name of the person involved:
> 
> a. Putting disks, CDs, or any other item in the computer
> b. Taking disks, CDs, or any other item out of the computer
> c. Uploading disks, CDs, or any other item
> d. Viewing a preview of a report
> e. Putting a report on the Web, even if this is done from another computer
> f. Printing a report
> g. NOTE WHAT.S ON THE SCREEN: Use binoculars to view the screen.
> - Note upload icons.
> - Use binoculars to read and record error messages. Note the time.
> - Note indicators of processes, when a status bar shows how much is left
> to do
> 
> h. PROGRAM CRASHES:
> - Watch to see if the program suddenly disappears from the screen (a
> program crash) or any system error message appears. If so, note the time
> and other details, and see below for how to record system crashes.
> - Get the date and time and note who was at the computer
> - Note whether any results were being transmitted or uploaded at the time
> the crash occurred.
> - Did the crash take down the whole computer or did it just close the
> tabulator program unexpectedly.
> - Log all activities and conversations that occur just after the crash. If
> have a tape recorder, leave it in your purse, now is the time to turn it
> on. But keep making notes regardless of whether you have tape, and trust
> your gut. What you think might be important is probably important.
> 
> WRITE DOWN EVERYTHING YOU CAN FIND OUT ABOUT MODEMS.
> 
> i. Note when, where, and who feeds ballot data into the computer in the
> central office. Describe what they are feeding the cards into, where the
> items are located, who does it, and when.
> 
> j. DISK MANAGEMENT:
> 
> - Note what kind of data storage device is used to move data around. You
> are looking for floppy disks, CDs, USB keys (about the size of a pack of
> gum).
> - Note where they get the disk from originally (whether it was from the
> machine, meaning it could have a program or data on it already, or out of
> a package of new disks).
> - Track the chain of custody: Where it is taken, and have someone watch it
> when taken to any other machine, note what programs you can see on the
> other machine
> - Note whether (and what time) it comes back and if it is put into the
> machine again.
> k. Moving the results: They have to move the results somehow. Ask
> questions about their procedures.
> - Is someone coming and going every hour or so with paper results?
> - Are they moving results to the Internet with a floppy or CD or USB key
> (looks like a little piece of plastic, about the size of a piece of gum)
> - If no one is leaving the machine to post the results, chances are they
> are doing this at the computer, meaning they are probably hooked up to a
> network or the Internet. Ask questions about the details and record what
> they say, and the name of the person who says it.
> l. If you see somebody open a web page or they do something that lets you
> know there has been Internet access, write it down.
> 
> m. BEHAVIORAL CUES:
> 
> - Note whether people look worried or stressed. Log the time it begins and
> the time it ends and who they are.
> - A now a word about .wranglers.. Some elections offices appoint a person
> -- sometimes a party observer they are chummy with -- to act as
> .wranglers.. They identify any person who might ask troublesome questions,
> and if an event occurs that could cause embarrassment, the appointed
> wrangler then goes over to distract the observers. Really. This is an
> elections procedure in some jurisdictions. They actually call it a
> wrangler.
> - If someone comes over and engages you in conversation, look around, and
> see if officials have suddenly congregated into an office or people are
> huddling over a computer. See if you can find out what you are not
> supposed to see.
> - Log behavior that is distracting, noting the time and person.
> - Log time and people involved in other distraction events, for example:
> The lights suddenly go out; a fire alarm goes off; someone spills
> something, loud noises, someone knocks something over.
> 
> RECORDS TO REQUEST:
> 
> Each state has a public records act, but in most cases, you can get
> records you ask for if you are nice. Here are important records you.ll
> want:
> 
> 1. Get a copy of each INTERIM RESULTS REPORT. Stand guard over what you
> have. If someone comes in to remove or .replace one with a better copy.
> hang onto the first and take the replacement, marking it. Make sure all
> interim reports are time-stamped by the computer. If they aren.t, note the
> exact time you see them appear.
> 
> 2. Request the COMPUTER AUDIT LOG for Oct. 29-Nov 2 (actually, it is
> important to get the printout BEFORE YOU LEAVE that night. It will only be
> a few pages, and can be printed from the vote-tally program.s menu.
> 
> 3. Ask for a copy of all the POLLING PLACE RESULTS SLIPS. These are sent
> in with the results cartridges. Try to get copies before you leave that
> night. If they won.t give copies to you then, put in a public records
> request and ask how soon you can pick them up.
> 
> 4. Ask for a copy of THE UPLOAD LOGS. These are on the computer and can be
> printed out on election night. They list each polling place and the time
> results were uploaded.
> 
> 5. There are ADDITIONAL LOGS in the Diebold GEMS programs you can request:
> From the GEMS folder .data., ask for the poster logs. There may be folders
> in the GEMS .data. directory titled .download., .log., .poster. and
> .results.. Ask for copies of these logs.
> 
> 6. Here.s a report that is very long but incredibly important and
> valuable. Ask if you can have the ELECTION NIGHT DETAIL REPORT -- the
> precinct by precinct results as of the time all memory cards are uploaded
> from all precincts. Depending on the system, they.ll call it different
> things -- in Diebold, it is called the Statement of Votes Cast (SOVC)
> report.
> 
> 7. Let us know which REPORTS THEY REFUSE to give you on Election Night. We
> can then put in Freedom of Information (public records) requests formally.
> 
> Once we have your observation log, and the records you obtain on Election
> Night, we can start matching up events and data to audit for anomalies.
> 
> # # # # #
> 
> Post information in the county and state at BlackBoxVoting.ORG. If the
> site is hacked out, come back as soon as it is up and post the
> information.
> 
> Thank you, and let.s have an orderly election.
> 
> # # # # #
> 
> Now, there is a film crew who has been brave enough to capture what's
> really going on:
> 
> THIS IS THE ONE: Here's the film that's breaking new ground on voting
> machine investigations. Includes never before seen footage and
> information:
> 
> download 30 minute preview of the upcoming feature film.
> 
> NOTE: Please give your attention to the real film by the real
> investigators: Russell Michaels, Simon Ardizzone, and Robert Carrillo
> Cohen -- they are the real deal. (Someone who ran off with a portion of
> the proprietary footage has been pitching a similarly named, inferior
> production which is missing most of the good stuff.) By the way, we've
> worked with most of the documentary producers out there, and Russell
> Michaels, Simon Ardizzone and Robert Carrillo Cohen are in a class by
> themselves -- In my opinion, they are the only filmmakers who have been
> doing real, in-depth, long-term in-the-field investigations on this issue
> -- Bev Harris.
> 
> Remember:
> 
> - Don't concede: Candidates, make a statement about voting without
> auditing. Hold off on your concession until the canvass is done
> - Gotta be replaced: If your county melts down into litigation, hold
> officials accountable if they chose to ignore warnings and failed to
> mitigate risks with preventive actions (like disconnecting telephone
> modems).
> 
> Note that most voting machine problems will be found between Nov. 3-12,
> during the canvass, and a few weeks later, when public records requests
> are obtained.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html

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