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Message-ID: <418F2783.4090301@schimmetje.com>
From: patryn at schimmetje.com (patryn)
Subject: MSIE <IFRAME> and <FRAME> tag NAME property
bufferoverflow PoC exploit (was: python does mangleme (with IE bugs!))
Berend-Jan Wever wrote:
> I hope they fixed it by accident, seeing what the other option would
imply.
Certainly puts all that jive they've been spewing to the press in a
different perspective.
Microsoft has begun to investigate the Iframe vulnerability and has not
been made aware of any program designed to exploit the flaw. (You'd
think they'd monitor the lists - p)
"Upon completion of this investigation, Microsoft will take the
appropriate action to protect our customers, which may include providing
a fix through our monthly release process or an out-of-cycle security
update, depending on customer needs"
"Microsoft is concerned that this new report of a vulnerability in
Internet Explorer was not disclosed responsibly, potentially putting
computer users at risk"
http://news.com.com/Exploit+code+makes+IE+flaw+more+dangerous/2100-1002_3-5439370.html
But then again who doesn't like to bash Redmond, I'm curious what the
"investigation" is turning up though.
patryn
Berend-Jan Wever wrote:
> Hmmm... MSDN DHTML Reference mentions 6 different flavors of the NAME
property:
> 1) For a lot of tags like A, APPLET, IMG, INPUT, etc... this includes
EMBED
> 2) FRAME, FRAMESET, IFRAME
> 3) META
> 4) namespace
> 5) PARAM
> 6) window
>
> I figured all the tags mentioned under 2 were affected and the rest
wasn't. Now I hear <EMBED> is also working ? Somebody might wanna go
through each and every tag to see which are affected and which aren't.
>
> SHDOCVW.DLL version 6.0.2800.1400 and 6.0.2800.1584 are known to be
vulnerable.
> SHDOCVW.DLL version 6.00.2900.2518 seems to be immune to the BoF
(ships with XP PRO SP2).
>
> The immune version got me wondering if they knew about the bug ? If
not, did they expect the code could be buggy and just rewrote it to be
sure it was safe for SP2 ? Or was there just a code rewrite or another
reason why the bug got silently fixed...? I hope they fixed it by
accident, seeing what the other option would imply.
>
> Cheers,
> SkyLined
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Menashe Eliezer" <menashe@...jan.com>
> To: "Berend-Jan Wever" <skylined@...p.tudelft.nl>;
<full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com>
> Sent: Sunday, November 07, 2004 23:21
> Subject: RE: [Full-Disclosure] MSIE <IFRAME> and <FRAME> tag NAME
property bufferoverflow PoC exploit (was: python does mangleme (with IE
bugs!))
>
>
>
>>The published exploit is working also with the <EMBED> tag, and not just
>>with the <IFRAME> and the <FRAME> tags.
>>Finjan's advisory can be found at:
>>http://www.finjan.com/SecurityLab/AttackandExploitReports/alert_show.asp
>>?attack_release_id=114
>>
>>==
>>Regards,
>>Menashe Eliezer
>>Senior application security architect
>>Malicious Code Research Center
>>Finjan Software
>>http://www.finjan.com/mcrc
>>
>>Prevention is the best cure!
>>
>>
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: morning_wood [mailto:se_cur_ity@...mail.com]
>>Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2004 3:44 PM
>>To: Berend-Jan Wever; full-disclosure@...ts.netsys.com;
>>bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
>>Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] MSIE <IFRAME> and <FRAME> tag NAME
>>property bufferoverflow PoC exploit (was: python does mangleme (with IE
>>bugs!))
>>
>>bindshell success ( html run from local ) connect from remote success...
>>this is NASTY
>>if shellcode modified this will do reverse or exe drop i assume....
>>
>>good work,
>>
>>Donnie Werner
>>
>>
>>-----------------------------------------------
>>This message was scanned for malicious content and viruses by Finjan
Internet Vital Security 1Box(tm)
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>
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