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Message-ID: <E760FDC711985D0B6D4AEF40@utd49554.utdallas.edu>
From: pauls at utdallas.edu (Paul Schmehl)
Subject: University Researchers Challenge Bush Win In
 Florida

--On Wednesday, November 24, 2004 05:39:31 AM +0000 Jason Coombs 
<jasonc@...ence.org> wrote:
>
> In the case in point, even with the variables you mention, the entire
> technical problem can be reduced to observing how the election officials
> in various places have historically constructed ballots and influence
> just those that can be influenced in just those states where it will
> matter. The Republican party (my party) apparently has advantages over
> others when it comes to influencing the technical details of the design
> of voting machines. Diebold, for example.
>
The horse has already been packed up and shipped from the rendering plant, 
but I'll give this *one* more try.  (One side note - the management of 
Diebold are mostly Democrats, not Republicans, not that *that* makes one 
iota of difference in the competence (or lack thereof) in designing 
electronic balloting equipment.  Pointing to someone's party affiliation as 
proof of something is merely a distraction from the real issues.)

You are talking about an extremely complex and unlikely set of 
possibilities, *all* of which have to fall into place perfectly for this to 
happen.  It might be fun as speculation, but the implementation would be 
nigh until impossible and would take some real genius to pull off.
>
> It makes just about as much sense for every regional election office to
> do their ballot construction differently as it does for everyone to
> create their own home grown crypto.
>
And yet it's done all over America.  Imagine that.
>
> Your point about differences in ballot construction is also a red herring
> to begin with. If you think that there is the same degree of variability
> with ballots in electronic voting machines as there is with legacy
> ballots, then perhaps you are the one who does not know how the process
> really works with the machines in question.
>
Why would you assume the ballots all have to be the same just because the 
same machines are being used to count them?

Given three candidates for President (and there are usually more than that) 
there are at least six different ways the ballot could be arranged *even* 
if the basic design was the same.

Furthermore, the methodology used by an electronic voting machine is 
independent of the ballot design, for all intents and purposes.  For 
example, an optical reader merely senses the dark spots where a vote has 
been cast.  *Which* candidate that represents is determined by the 
configuration, which is determined by the construction of the ballot. 
Having to fit within certain machine-driven parameters does not force the 
ballot design into one pattern.  The votes could be on the left, in the 
center, on the right, staggered from left to right, staggered from right to 
left.  The possibilities are great.

Yet you want to control *all* of that to "take advantage of statistical 
anomalies" in the equipment?

Do we have a mathematician on this list who can calculate the probabilities 
of this?

I would contend that it is infinitely more likely that the machines would 
be either deliberately tampered with or incompetently misconfigured, ending 
up in statistical anomalies then I would ever consider your scenario 
possible.
>
> You really need to stop making things seem so complicated that the
> difficulty of influencing their behavior or outcome couldn't possibly be
> surmounted.
>
Jason, I'm not making anything complicated.  I'm observing the complication 
that already exists - the complication that you apparently refuse to 
acknowledge.

Paul Schmehl (pauls@...allas.edu)
Adjunct Information Security Officer
The University of Texas at Dallas
AVIEN Founding Member
http://www.utdallas.edu


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