full-disclosure - /bin/rm file access vulnerability

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Message-ID: <1104508495.18571.7.camel@localhost>
From: frank at knobbe.us (Frank Knobbe)
Subject: /bin/rm file access vulnerability

On Thu, 2004-12-30 at 20:56 -0700, Jeffrey Denton wrote:
> Nothing new here.  That is one of the problems with DAC systems, the
> admin has total control over the system.
[...]
> To prevent the above from happening, use a MAC or a RBAC system such
> as Trusted Solaris.


You should also be able to use file flags such as undeletable and
immutable together with higher security levels (at least under BSD) to
prevent root to remove/change the file under normal run-levels. 

(Normal run-levels excludes single-user mode and stunts like mounting
the drive in non-native environments.)

Regards,
Frank

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