From: dave at immunitysec.com (Dave Aitel)
Subject: Multiple Backdoors found in eEye Products (IRIS
	and Secure

Well, for all who read this (and care) I tested a moderately old version 
of SecureIIS I have installed on some VM, and I didn't see any calls to 
CreateProcess anywhere in any of the eEye DLL's. Nor did I see any 
suspicious getprocaddr's/loadlibrarya's that would indicate a backdoor.

For those who might try this little game, eEye's secureIIS is basically 
a http_filter module that loads into Inetinfo which takes requests and 
passes them off to a ncalrpc service (the event bus, as they'd call it). 
It's going to get the request about 3 times during the course of events.

Of course, this sort of thing is basically impossible to disprove - 
especially without source.

-dave


Lance Gusto wrote:

>
> Hey Dave,
>
>
> I cannot disclosed much information (based on request/threats made by 
> certain organizations
> whom may be involved) I am sure you can understand.
>
> But we have tested Iris versions 3.0 and up ... As I previously stated 
> it doesn't appear to
> exist in the 2.x series of Iris.
>
> I am not the main tester involved here, but I was told that there is 
> some sort of clandestine
> chaining mechanism to create the processes I believe. I will provide 
> the "lists" I have sent this
> too with more information as soon as some of the other testers 
> involved come back from their
> respective holiday breaks.
>
>
>> From: Dave Aitel <dave@...unitysec.com>
>> To: Lance Gusto <thegusto22@...mail.com>
>> Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] Multiple Backdoors found in eEye 
>> Products (IRIS and SecureIIS)
>> Date: Wed, 29 Dec 2004 11:29:55 -0500
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The SecureIIS Backdoor:
>>>
>>> The SecureIIS backdoor was alot easier to discover but very well
>>> placed. The SecureIIS backdoor is triggered by a specifically
>>> crafted HTTP HEAD request. Here is a incomplete layout of how
>>> to exploit this:
>>>
>>
>> Which version did you test? I'm not seeing it, or any intermodular 
>> calls to CreateProcess in the DLL that it loads up.
>>
>> -dave
>>
>>
>>>
>>> HEAD /<24 byte constant string>/PORT_ADDRESS.ASP HTTP/1.1
>>>
>>> PORT - Will be the port to bind a shell.
>>> ADDRESS - Address for priority binding (0 - For any).
>>>
>>>
>>> [snip]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Local Deduction:
>>>
>>> There are a two possiblilites here, either eEye's code has been
>>> altered by some attacker or this has been sanctioned by the
>>> company (or at least the developers were fully aware of this).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Conclusion:
>>>
>>> It is very very shameful that a somewhat reputable like eEye is acting
>>> in a very childish, unprofessional manner. I figure that is why the
>>> code is closed source. There are several active exploits available 
>>> that I
>>> (the author of this advisory) didn't create floating around. The only
>>> logical solution will be to not use the mentioned eEye products for the
>>> time being or at least downgrade to the non-backdoored versions.
>>>
>>> We will be investigation eEye's Blink Product for any clandestine 
>>> backdoors.
>>>
>>> _________________________________________________________________
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>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>
>>
>>
>
> _________________________________________________________________
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>
> _______________________________________________
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