full-disclosure - [OpenPKG-SA-2005.002] OpenPKG Security Advisory (sudo)

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Message-ID: <OpenPKG-SA-2005.002@openpkg.org>
From: openpkg at openpkg.org (OpenPKG)
Subject: [OpenPKG-SA-2005.002] OpenPKG Security Advisory
	(sudo)

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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@...npkg.org                         openpkg@...npkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2005.002                                          17-Jan-2005
________________________________________________________________________

Package:             sudo
Vulnerability:       arbitrary code execution
OpenPKG Specific:    no

Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:          Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT      <= sudo-1.6.8p1-20041104    >= sudo-1.6.8p2-20041112
OpenPKG 2.2          <= sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.1       >= sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2
OpenPKG 2.1          <= sudo-1.6.7p5-2.1.1       >= sudo-1.6.7p5-2.1.2

Dependent Packages:  none

Description:
  Liam Helmer discovered a design flaw in Sudo [0], a program used to
  control user privilege escalation. The Sudo function rebuild_env()
  fails to sufficiently clean potentially dangerous variables from
  the environment passed to the program to be executed. An attacker
  with Sudo access to a shell script that uses GNU Bash may therefore
  run arbitrary commands with other (including superuser) privileges.
  The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the
  identifier CAN-2004-1051 [1] to the problem.

  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
  rpm -q sudo". If you have the "sudo" package installed and its version
  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
  (see Solution) [2][3].

Workaround:
  Add a line to the sudoers file containing the text 'Defaults
  env_reset'. This causes the environment to only contain the variables
  HOME, LOGNAME, PATH, SHELL, TERM, and USER, thus preventing an attack.

Solution:
  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  [4][5], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [6][7] or a mirror
  location, verify its integrity [8], build a corresponding binary RPM
  from it [2] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  binary RPM [3]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.2, perform the
  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  other releases adjust accordingly).

  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  ftp> bin
  ftp> cd release/2.2/UPD
  ftp> get sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
  ftp> bye
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
  $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
  $ su -
  # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.*.rpm
________________________________________________________________________

References:
  [0] http://www.sudo.ws/
  [1] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1051
  [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
  [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/sudo-1.6.7p5-2.1.2.src.rpm
  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
  [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/
  [8] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@...npkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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