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Message-ID: <003601c52c5e$cf9df230$1464110a@bigdog>
From: listuser at seifried.org (Kurt Seifried)
Subject: Re: choice-point screw-up and secure hashes
Hashing SSN numbers and CC numbers doesn't matter unless you use a really
huge salt that is stored seperately. Why? Not enough variation. A credit
card number for example:
4520 1234 1234 1234
except the first 4 digits (4520) are the bank code, so for example in canada
if you guess 4520 as the first 4 digits that's a safe guess since it's a
Visa from TD Canadatrust (one of the big 3 banks here). You're now down to
10^12 which isn't a very huge search space. The same goes for SSN's, they
simply aren't long enough to be meaningful, in cannada our SIN number (same
idea as your SSN) is only 9 digits long. That's a trivially shot search
space.
To put it bluntly you basically can't store SSN/SIN/CC's in a "Secure"
manner that obscures them significantly enough to prevent an attacker from
brute forcing them unless you go to some extreme method, which companies
won't do.
The sad part is there is NO (Zero, Nada, Zilch) incentive for companies to
treat this data securely. Information for a hundred thousand people is
stolen. So what? The company is not criminally liable in any way (I haven't
heard of any laws yet). Civilly they're barely liable either. It'll be more
of the same until we have laws with penalties for allowing theft of customer
data. To bad insurance won't work, when a physical item is stolen it costs
money to get a new one, and insurance companies won't pay out unless you
took due care/diligence, OTOH if you steal all the electronic data (and even
erase it) a company just restores from a backup and goes on with life.
Kurt
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