full-disclosure - OpenText FirstClass 8.0 Client Arbitrary File Execution

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <ad629b8205041104183721ca7@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon Apr 11 12:18:30 2005
From: dilabox at gmail.com (dila)
Subject: OpenText FirstClass 8.0 Client Arbitrary File
	Execution

Product: OpenText FirstClass 8.0 Client
Homepage: http://www.firstclass.com
Platform: Microsoft Windows
Description: Insufficient validation of user input allows arbitrary
file execution

FirstClass bookmark files allow the user to organise their web
address's using the familiar FirstClass desktop environment. The
vulnerable field has been highlighted in the attached screen dump. The
URL text string is passed directly to the Windows ShellExecute API,
which allows any local/network file to be executed when the bookmark
is accessed. These bookmark files can also be set to "auto-open" if
the user has sufficient privileges.

A similar issue affecting URL's in FirstClass RTF documents was
apparently reported last year, but remains unpatched.

Simply comparing the first seven characters of the input string to
"http://" should be sufficient protection.

- dila
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: screen.png
Type: image/png
Size: 12471 bytes
Desc: not available
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20050411/928254ca/screen.png