full-disclosure - Can ISO15408 evaluated products be trusted?

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Message-ID: <428F8C2B.6000107@yahoo.co.jp>
Date: Sat May 21 20:30:01 2005
From: h_hikita at yahoo.co.jp (HHikita)
Subject: Can ISO15408 evaluated products be trusted?

Nora Barrera wrote:
> But those reports do not contain any valuable
> information for me. What kind of tests were done? How?

You should look into sections that cover test activity in the CEM.
(5.8, 6.8, 7.9, 8.9)

For EAL4 this would be the following.
8.9.2 Evaluation of Coverage (ATE_COV.2)
8.9.3 Evaluation of Depth (ATE_DPT.1)
8.9.4 Evaluation of Functional tests (ATE_FUN.1)
8.9.5 Evaluation of Independent testing (ATE_IND.2)

The evaluation of the test relys on the developer test documentation
(test plan, test procedure, expected results...which is not disclosed).

> What's the use of security functions if they can be
> circumvented?

It is rather a matter of proving that the Target Of Evaluation (TOE)
adequately protects the Asset.

I would not want to spend US$1,000,000,000,000,000,000 to
protect my wallet (which has about $20 in it right now).

On the other hand I hope the US government spends whatever
is needed to protect the IT system for a nuclear missile
launch system.

So, it should suffice to prove that the security functions
can not be circumvented by an threat agent described in the ST.
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