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Message-ID: <42C42A88.9090609@trinityz.com>
Date: Thu Jun 30 18:47:25 2005
From: smilner at trinityz.com (Steve Milner)
Subject: Re: Publishing exploit code - what is it good for
Here is my quick $0.02:
In a lot of environments (including the one that I work on/in) we make
our own modifications to software to get them to work in such a way that
is more beneficial to our organization. Because we make modifications to
the way software works we don't always know if the software we are using
is actually vulnerable to exploits based upon version number. In some
cases we have actually fixed a security problem without realizing it
before any known vuln was released. It's also possible to open up older
problems through patching and coding. Having exploit code available is a
huge plus as it lets us test our software. Without it we wouldn't know
(as quickly) if our in house version of XYZ is exploitable to the newest
vuln release.
In a nutshell, exploit code allows people to easily find out if they are
vulnerable to a specific problem without spending lots of time looking
into it. After all, I'd rather exploit my own code and fix it as opposed
to having someone else do it while I try to scramble to figure it out.
Steve
Aviram Jenik wrote:
>Hi,
>
>I recently had a discussion about the concept of full disclosure with one of
>the top security analysts in a well-known analyst firm. Their claim was that
>companies that release exploit code (like us, but this is also relevant for
>bugtraq, full disclosure, and several security research firms) put users at
>risks while those at risk gain nothing from the release of the exploit.
>
>I tried the regular 'full disclosure advocacy' bit, but the analyst remained
>reluctant. Their claim was that based on their own work experience, a
>security administrator does not have a need for the exploit code itself, and
>the vendor information is enough. The analyst was willing to reconsider their
>position if an end-user came forward and talked to them about their own
>benefit of public exploit codes. Quote: " If I speak to an end-user
>organization and they express legitimate needs for exploit code, then I'll
>change my opinion."
>
>Help me out here. Full disclosure is important for me, as I'm sure it is for
>most of the people on these two lists. If you're an end-user organization and
>are willing to talk to this analyst and explain your view (pro-FD, I hope),
>drop me a note and I'll put you in direct contact.
>
>Please note: I don't need any arguments pro or against full disclosure; all
>this has been discussed in the past. I also don't need you to tell me about
>someone else or some other project (e.g. nessus, snort) that utilizes these
>exploits. Tried that. Didn't work.
>
>What I need is a security administrator, CSO, IT manager or sys admin that can
>explain why they find public exploits are good for THEIR organizations. Maybe
>we can start changing public opinion with regards to full disclosure, and
>hopefully start with this opinion leader.
>
>TIA.
>
>
>
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