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Message-ID: <CDA211A5463B564084335139C81FB18AA12B06@onrex2.onr.navy.mil> Date: Fri Jul 1 13:06:00 2005 From: David_Morales at onr.navy.mil (Morales, David (Seta)) Subject: RE: Publishing exploit code - what is it good for Hi Aviram, I use this type of code to ensure that when patches are applied, it does not "break" any part of the OS and or application which has already been patched. Also I don't take anyone's word that a system has been patched or a security hole has been fixed without testing and re-certifying the application or the OS. Without the exploit code I would not be able to verify any of this and could very well leave my systems wide open. In a private sector company this code should be used in the same manner, to ensure compliance with SOX. To leave systems untested would be hanging your company out to dry. David Morales moraled@....navy.mil 703-696-4022 -----Original Message----- From: Aviram Jenik [mailto:aviram@...ondsecurity.com] Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2005 8:14 AM To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk; bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Publishing exploit code - what is it good for Hi, I recently had a discussion about the concept of full disclosure with one of the top security analysts in a well-known analyst firm. Their claim was that companies that release exploit code (like us, but this is also relevant for bugtraq, full disclosure, and several security research firms) put users at risks while those at risk gain nothing from the release of the exploit. I tried the regular 'full disclosure advocacy' bit, but the analyst remained reluctant. Their claim was that based on their own work experience, a security administrator does not have a need for the exploit code itself, and the vendor information is enough. The analyst was willing to reconsider their position if an end-user came forward and talked to them about their own benefit of public exploit codes. Quote: " If I speak to an end-user organization and they express legitimate needs for exploit code, then I'll change my opinion." Help me out here. Full disclosure is important for me, as I'm sure it is for most of the people on these two lists. If you're an end-user organization and are willing to talk to this analyst and explain your view (pro-FD, I hope), drop me a note and I'll put you in direct contact. Please note: I don't need any arguments pro or against full disclosure; all this has been discussed in the past. I also don't need you to tell me about someone else or some other project (e.g. nessus, snort) that utilizes these exploits. Tried that. Didn't work. What I need is a security administrator, CSO, IT manager or sys admin that can explain why they find public exploits are good for THEIR organizations. Maybe we can start changing public opinion with regards to full disclosure, and hopefully start with this opinion leader. TIA. -- Aviram Jenik Beyond Security http://www.BeyondSecurity.com http://www.SecuriTeam.com
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