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Message-ID: <20050702002052.678FD256@lists.grok.org.uk> Date: Sat Jul 2 14:56:35 2005 From: harry at slaptop.com (Harry Metcalfe) Subject: RE: Publishing exploit code - what is it good for I agree that in some cases, release of exploit code is unnecessary - but in other cases, it is completely essential. In an open source product - as was recently the case with the osCommerce HTTP splitting vulnerability - it is necessary for programmers to fix vulnerabilities, in cases where the organisation that produces the software does not release a patch or updated version in time. Also, open source products - especially web applications - are often modified by their users. I am responsible for maintaining several osCommerce carts that have been heavily modified to suit the needs of the companies that use them. Even if a patch or new version were released for a security problem, it would be of little help for me: to install it would require remodifying each cart. This would be a horrendous waste of time; it is far quicker simply to fix the vulnerability in each installed instance, and in cases like that, proof of concept code is essential: without it, one cannot reliably test fixes applied to the product. Finally, proof of concept code has value - in all cases - as a means of proving the existence of a vulnerability. It is the most efficient way to provide other researchers with the proof that a vulnerability is real, with the means to reproduce the problem, and with the ability to check the original researcher's approach for flaws or related vulnerabilities that may not have been discovered the first time round. Release of proof of concept code is obviously dangerous, but not *very* dangerous: it's a trade-off between the verifying the quality of research and the ability to fix problems, and the safety of the wider community. I assert that, as is often the case with this type of problem, the benefits outweigh the risks: blackhat communities will likely distribute their own exploit code anyway, and determined attackers will not be put off by the lack of proof of concept code. In other words, the lack of proof of concept *can* harm the community, and is unlikely to make much difference to evildoers. Harry Metcalfe -----Original Message----- From: Aviram Jenik [mailto:aviram@...ondsecurity.com] Sent: 30 June 2005 13:14 To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk; bugtraq@...urityfocus.com Subject: Publishing exploit code - what is it good for Hi, I recently had a discussion about the concept of full disclosure with one of the top security analysts in a well-known analyst firm. Their claim was that companies that release exploit code (like us, but this is also relevant for bugtraq, full disclosure, and several security research firms) put users at risks while those at risk gain nothing from the release of the exploit. I tried the regular 'full disclosure advocacy' bit, but the analyst remained reluctant. Their claim was that based on their own work experience, a security administrator does not have a need for the exploit code itself, and the vendor information is enough. The analyst was willing to reconsider their position if an end-user came forward and talked to them about their own benefit of public exploit codes. Quote: " If I speak to an end-user organization and they express legitimate needs for exploit code, then I'll change my opinion." Help me out here. Full disclosure is important for me, as I'm sure it is for most of the people on these two lists. If you're an end-user organization and are willing to talk to this analyst and explain your view (pro-FD, I hope), drop me a note and I'll put you in direct contact. Please note: I don't need any arguments pro or against full disclosure; all this has been discussed in the past. I also don't need you to tell me about someone else or some other project (e.g. nessus, snort) that utilizes these exploits. Tried that. Didn't work. What I need is a security administrator, CSO, IT manager or sys admin that can explain why they find public exploits are good for THEIR organizations. Maybe we can start changing public opinion with regards to full disclosure, and hopefully start with this opinion leader. TIA. -- Aviram Jenik Beyond Security http://www.BeyondSecurity.com http://www.SecuriTeam.com
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