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Message-ID: <1C09DF36EB7A3F489633C919E7413501150D7B@mapibe09.exchange.xchg> Date: Tue Jul 19 13:43:00 2005 From: ak at red-database-security.com (Kornbrust, Alexander) Subject: Oracle Advisory: Run any OS Command via unauthorized Oracle Reports Hello 3 months ago (15-april-2005) I informed the Oracle Security Team (secalert_us@...cle.com) that I will publish bug details if the bugs are not fixed with the next critical patch update (CPU July 2005). I know that Oracle products are complex and a good patch quality need some time. That's why I offered Oracle additional time if 3 months are not sufficient for fixing the bugs. Oracle never asked for more time. Oracle's behaviour not fixing critical security bugs for a long time (over 650 days) is not acceptable for their customers. Oracle put their customers in danger. At least one critical vulnerability can be abused from any attacker via internet. I decided to publish these vulnerabilities because it is possible to mitigate the risk of these vulnerabilities by using the workarounds provided in the advisories. Kind Regards Alexander Kornbrust www.red-database-security.com ################################################## Red-Database-Security GmbH - Oracle Security Advisory Run any OS Command via unauthorized Oracle Reports Name Run any OS Command via unauthorized Oracle Reports Systems Affected Oracle Reports 6.0, 6i, 9i, 10g Severity High Risk Category OS command execution Vendor URL http://www.oracle.com Author Alexander Kornbrust (ak at red-database-security.com) Date 19 July 2005 (V 1.00) Advisory AKSEC2003-014 Inital bug report 663 days ago Advisory-URL http://www.red-database-security.com/advisory/oracle_reports_run_any_os_ command. html Details ####### Oracle Reports is Oracle's award-winning, high-fidelity enterprise reporting tool. It enables businesses to give immediate access to information to all levels within and outside of the organization in an unrivaled scalable and secure environment. Oracle Reports, a component of the Oracle Application Server, is used by Oracle itself for the E-Business Suite. Many large customers are using Oracle Reports as reporting tool for their enterprise applications. Oracle Reports starts reports executables (*.rep or *.rdf) from any directory and any user on the application server. These reports are executed as user Oracle or System (Windows). An attacker which is able to upload a specially crafted reports executable to the application server is able to run any OS command or read and write text files on the application server (e.g. wdbsvr.app containing Oracle passwords). He can overtake the application server. The upload could be done via Webdav (Part of the Oracle Application Server), Webutil, SMB, SAMBA, NFS, FTP, ... By using the report parameter with an absolute path it is possible to execute reports executables from ANY directory and ANY user. Testcase ######## 1. Create or modify a simple report and add an ORA_FFI call to run OS commands or a TEXT_IO call to create or read text files on the application server. Details how to call OS Program/Command from Reports (Metalink ID: 181086.1) or Read and Write Textfiles Using TEXT_IO (Metalink: 33247.1) are available on Oracle Metalink. 2. Generate the reports executable (e.g. hacker.rdf or hacker.rep) for the destination platform (e.g. Linux, Solaris, Windows, ...) 3. Copy the reports executable hacker.rdf to a directory on the Oracle Application Server (e.g. via SMB, file upload, Webdav, Samba, NFS, Webutil, FTP, ...) 4. Run the report "hacker.rdf" as user Oracle and specify an absolute path for the reports executable http://myserver.com:7779/reports/rwservlet?server=repserv+report=/tmp/ha cker.rdf+destype=cache+desformat=PDF 5. The host command is executed (ORA_FFI) or a file could be read/write (TEXT_IO) as user Oracle (Unix) or user SYTEM (Windows). Workarounds ########### Available at http://www.red-database-security.com/advisory/oracle_reports_run_any_os_ command.html Patch Information ################# This bug is NOT FIXED with Critical Patch Update July 2005 (CPU July 2005). It seems that Oracle is NOT INTERESTED to fix this issue and provide patches. History ####### 25-sep-2003 Oracle secalert was informed 26-sep-2003 Bug confirmed 15-apr-2005 Red-Database-Security informed Oracle secalert that this vulnerability will publish after CPU July 2005 Red-Database-Security offered Oracle more time if it is not possible to provide a fix ==> NO FEEDBACK. 12-jul-2005 Oracle published CPU July 2005 without fixing this issue 19-jul-2005 Red-Database-Security published this advisory (c) 2005 by Red-Database-Security GmbH - last update 19-july-2005
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