Message-ID: <1C09DF36EB7A3F489633C919E7413501150D7D@mapibe09.exchange.xchg>
Date: Tue Jul 19 13:45:55 2005
From: ak at red-database-security.com (Kornbrust, Alexander)
Subject: Oracle Advisory: Run any OS Command via
	unauthorized Oracle Forms

Hello

3 months ago (15-april-2005) I informed the Oracle Security Team
(secalert_us@...cle.com) that I will publish bug details if the bugs are
not fixed with the next critical patch update (CPU July 2005). I know
that Oracle products are complex and a good patch quality need some
time. That's why I offered Oracle additional time if 3 months are not
sufficient for fixing the bugs. Oracle never asked for more time.

Oracle's behaviour not fixing critical security bugs for a long time
(over 650 days) is not acceptable for their customers. Oracle put their
customers in danger. At least one critical vulnerability can be abused
from any attacker via internet.

I decided to publish these vulnerabilities because it is possible to
mitigate the risk of these vulnerabilities by using the workarounds
provided in the advisories.


Kind Regards

 Alexander Kornbrust

 www.red-database-security.com

##################################################
Red-Database-Security GmbH  - Oracle Security Advisory

Run any OS Command via unauthorized Oracle Forms


 Name                Run any OS Command via unauthorized Oracle Forms
 Systems Affected    Oracle (Web) Forms 4.5, 5.0, 6.0, 6i, 9i, 10g
 Severity            High Risk  
 Category            OS command execution
 Vendor URL          http://www.oracle.com 
 Author              Alexander Kornbrust (ak at
red-database-security.com) 
 Date                19 July 2005 (V 1.00) 
 Advisory            AKSEC2003-013
 Inital bug report   664 days ago
 Advisory-URL       
http://www.red-database-security.com/advisory/oracle_forms_run_any_os_co
mmand.html


Details
#######
Oracle Forms Services, a component of the Oracle Application Server, is
Oracle's long-established technology to design and build enterprise
applications. Oracle itself is using Oracle Forms for the E-Business
Suite. Many large customers are using Oracle Forms for their enterprise
applications.

Oracle Forms Services starts forms executables (*.fmx) from any
directory and any user on the application server. These forms are
executed as user Oracle or System (Windows). An attacker which is able
to upload a specially crafted forms executable to the application server
is able to run any OS command and can overtake the application server.
The upload could be done via Webdav (Part of the Oracle Application
Server), SMB, Webutil, SAMBA, NFS, FTP, ...

By using the form or module parameter with an absolute path it is
possible to execute forms executables from ANY directory and ANY user.


Testcase
########
1. Create or modify a simple forms module and add the following command
to the "WHEN_NEW_FORM_INSTANCE"-Trigger Host('ls >
forms_is_unsecure.txt' , NO_SCREEN);

2. Generate the forms executable (e.g. hacker.fmx) for the destination
platform (e.g. Linux, Solaris, Windows, ...)

3. Copy the forms executable hacker.fmx to a directory on the Oracle
Application Server (e.g. via SMB, file upload, Webdav, Samba, NFS,
Webutil, FTP, ...)

4. Run the form "hacker.fmx" as user Oracle and specify an absolute path
for the forms executable
http://myserver.com:7779/forms90/f90servlet?form=/public/johndoe/hacker.
fmx
or
http://myserver.com:7779/forms90/f90servlet?module=/tmp/hacker.fmx

5. The host command is executed as user Oracle (Unix) or user SYTEM
(Windows).



Workarounds
###########
Available at
http://www.red-database-security.com/advisory/oracle_forms_run_any_os_co
mmand.html


Patch Information
#################
This bug is NOT FIXED with Critical Patch Update July 2005 (CPU July
2005). It seems that Oracle is NOT INTERESTED to fix this issue and
provide patches for this issue. They recommend to migrate to Oracle
Forms 10g because 9i and 10g are binary
compatible.



History
#######
24-sep-2003 Oracle secalert was informed

25-sep-2003 Bug confirmed

15-apr-2005 Red-Database-Security informed Oracle secalert that this
vulnerability will publish after CPU July 2005 Red-Database-Security
offered 
Oracle more time if it is not possible to provide a fix ==> NO FEEDBACK.

18-apr-2005 Oracle Forms Product Management contacted.

20-apr-2005 Email from Product Management that customers should migrate
to Forms 10g. No patches for Forms 6i or 9i.

12-jul-2005 Oracle published CPU July 2005 without fixing this issue

19-jul-2005 Red-Database-Security published this advisory




(c) 2005 by Red-Database-Security GmbH - last update 19-july-2005

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