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Message-ID: <42EE6695.3090508@science.org>
Date: Mon Aug  1 19:14:02 2005
From: jasonc at science.org (Jason Coombs)
Subject: Cisco IOS Shellcode Presentation

Bart.Lansing@...ls.com wrote:
> It occurs to me that your solution is flawed as well.  What assurance do 
> we have that your "protected storage" is future-proof (i.e. unbreachable 
> by an means whatsoever)?

It doesn't have to be unbreachable by any means whatsoever, it has to be 
unbreachable from a remote location. This is easy to accomplish by not 
connecting the protected storage to a network interface.

The box can still be owned by an attacker who gains physical access to 
the device, but so what? The protected storage will never be owned by a 
JPEG and the CPU will never ignore its built-in machine code 
authentication logic because it would not be implemented in software or 
firmware.

Regards,

Jason Coombs
jasonc@...ence.org

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