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Date: Mon Aug 22 22:48:06 2005
From: toddtowles at brookshires.com (Todd Towles)
Subject: Zotob Worm Remover

James, I agree with you. 

It was n3td3v that stated the following -  "The wireless devices were
most likely the primary source of the spread. Media outlets are
reporting wireless devices were only an accessory to the spread of the
worm."

I agree with Jan, that host based IPS could have stopped this. Cisco's
CSA is a good example of this type of technology. Host based IPS system
are commonly seen as anti-rootkit solutions, which is also a very very
good thing to have. But patch management should not be overlooked just
because you have a host IPS. The host IPS will give you time to patch,
but patch management is the last line of defense for vulns. I never said
it should be the first or only line of defense.

I am very firm believer in the defense in depth methodology.

-Todd

> -----Original Message-----
> From: James Tucker [mailto:jftucker@...il.com] 
> Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 4:08 PM
> To: Todd Towles
> Cc: Ron DuFresne; full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Zotob Worm Remover
> 
> It seems to me that the attack was less than a week old from 
> the start date. Default settings on a relatively unchanged 
> box would provide a suitable window of opportunity given the 
> availability of the worm to the deployer. This is more 
> important than network connectivity, which is not of security 
> concern as this is not the exploited layer. Disconnecting 
> networks is what you suggest when you're in trouble, not when 
> you're trying to maintain the daily balance of cost vs 
> function. Moreover, wireless is recieving the blame - however 
> this will only continue whilst your laptop is the device you 
> are using. Eventually will you blame the mobile phone 
> companies for allowing "dangerous traffic" to flow through 
> the repeaters? What about sattelite links - should we filter 
> those and knock the latency up another notch? No, it's the 
> software, once again. 
> Connectivity increases exposure, it doesn't decrease security 
> - the two are not one and the same. 1000 laptops in a city 
> centre network becoming infected less than a week from update 
> release would be unsuprising
> (read: defaults are once a week at 3). The security of these 
> laptops was not compromised by the wireless presence, it was 
> a medium of travel only. Now lets say, we go back in time and 
> remove all of the wireless NIC's. Now, there are only 750 
> laptops cause we can't generate as much revenue (joke), and 
> of these they're all still connected, just with a different 
> medium. The medium is (specification)centralised and routable 
> in the same manner (ah, so the medium can have 'implications' 
> ;) -  the infection rate is the same. Why? because they are 
> all connected. It's BEING CONNECTED not BEING WIRELESS that's 
> the issue here. Yes you may argue, pointlessly however, that 
> wireless has increased average connectivity, however once 
> again, this is only a medium. It's business/personal drive 
> that requires connectedness, not the technology itself.
> 
> Todd Towles wrote:
> > This is correct for the first day, maybe two. Then 
> unpatched laptops 
> > leave the corporate network, hit the internet outside the 
> firewall and 
> > then bring the worm back right to the heart of the network the very 
> > next day, bypassing the firewall all together. Firewall is just one 
> > step..it isn't a solve all. Patching would be the only way to stop 
> > this threat in all vectors. That was my point.
> > 
> > If you aren't blocking 445 on the border of your network, you have 
> > must worse problems with Zotob.
> > 
> > 
> >>-----Original Message-----
> >>From: Ron DuFresne [mailto:dufresne@...ternet.com]
> >>Sent: Monday, August 22, 2005 3:15 PM
> >>To: Todd Towles
> >>Cc: n3td3v; full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> >>Subject: RE: [Full-disclosure] Zotob Worm Remover
> >>
> >>On Mon, 22 Aug 2005, Todd Towles wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>Wireless really isn't a issue. You can get a worm from a
> >>
> >>cat 5 as easy
> >>
> >>>as you can from wireless. The problem was they weren't 
> patched. Why 
> >>>weren't they patched? Perhaps Change policy slowed them
> >>
> >>down, perhaps
> >>
> >>>it was the fear of broken programs..perhaps it was the QA 
> group..it 
> >>>doesn't really matter. They go the worm because they were
> >>
> >>not patched.
> >>
> >>And because they didn't properly filter port 445 is my 
> understanding.
> >>Unpatched systems behind FW's that fliter 445 were untouched.
> >>
> >>Thanks,
> >>
> >>Ron DuFresne
> >>--
> >>"Sometimes you get the blues because your baby leaves you. 
> >>Sometimes you get'em 'cause she comes back." --B.B. King
> >>        ***testing, only testing, and damn good at it too!***
> >>
> >>OK, so you're a Ph.D.  Just don't touch anything.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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> > 
> 

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