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Date: Sun Oct 16 06:04:05 2005
From: markus.jansson at (Markus Jansson)
Subject: Mozilla Thunderbird SMTP down-negotiation

Tim wrote:
> I agree that this is less than optimal.  Could you point me to the bug
> report you filed in bugzilla that requests these changes?

Here is one, you can follow the links to other ones :)

> It probably isn't that hard.  Why don't you write a patch? 

I dont have any knowledge of programming.

> Honestly though, this stuff is such a miniscule portion of overall
> security...  How many users actually care when websites don't even have
> valid certificates?  Heck, most browsers don't even check for CRLs by
> default, including IE.

True, but the ones who would like to check, they find that it is 
impossible. And the ones who are not used to check it, take an example 
from Opera how to make them check it: It clearly displays the symmetric 
and asymmetric key sizes in the addresslike/statusline when you are in 
https connection. Also, it warns if the symmetric keysize is secure, but 
asymmetric is insecure.

> There are many many more, much easier ways to steal someone's sensitive
> info without attacking the crypto.

Sometimes. But that doesnt mean that obious weakness should not be 
fixed. Heck, why even bother patching at all, since the "weakest" link 
is "always" the dumb user who will execute any file you email to 
them...lets just forget Windowsupdate then, and new versions to Firefox, 
right? ;)

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