full-disclosure - Google Talk cleartext credentials in process memory

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Date: Tue Nov 29 10:02:57 2005
From: 6ackpace at gmail.com (6ackpace)
Subject: Google Talk cleartext credentials in process
	memory

Hi,

If i am right Google Talk Beta Messenger cleartext credentials in process
memory still exist on the current version.
googles answer for this issue:
plain char -> hex char



6ackpace
On 11/29/05, Jaroslaw Sajko <sloik@...areal.net> wrote:
>
> pagvac wrote:
> > Title: Google Talk Beta Messenger cleartext credentials in process
> memory
> >
> >
> > Description
> >
> > Google Talk stores all user credentials (username and password) in
> > clear-text in the process memory. Such vulnerability was found on
> > August 25, 2005 (two days after the release of Google Talk) and has
> > already been patched by Google.
> >
> > This issue would occur regardless of whether the "Save Password"
> > feature was enabled or not.
>
> The same issue concerns many applications, ie. Gadu-Gadu - another
> instant messenger. In my opinion such "vulnerabilities" are not worthy
> publishing (for Gadu-Gadu we have not published this kind of software
> behaviour) because if you can dump other user process or trick him to
> execute any code then reading the password from the process memory is
> only one of many things which you can do.
>
> regards,
> js
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