full-disclosure - Google Talk cleartext credentials in process memory

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Date: Tue Nov 29 10:23:04 2005
From: unknown.pentester at gmail.com (pagvac)
Subject: Google Talk cleartext credentials in process
	memory

Personally I only tested the "patched" version by searching for the
ASCII (decimal) representation of my own password.

In other words, I searched for "mypassword" with a hex editor, rather
than its hexadecimal representation "6d7970617373776f7264"

If what you're saying is that all Google did is change the
cleartext password to its hexadecimal representation then you might be
completely right as I haven't tested this myself.

Anyways, if that's the case, then shame on Google for such a poor
attempt of obfuscation.

On 11/29/05, 6ackpace <6ackpace@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> If i am right Google Talk Beta Messenger cleartext credentials in process
> memory still exist on the current version.
> googles answer for this issue:
> plain char -> hex char
>
>
>
> 6ackpace
> On 11/29/05, Jaroslaw Sajko <sloik@...areal.net> wrote:
> >
> > pagvac wrote:
> > > Title: Google Talk Beta Messenger cleartext credentials in process
> memory
> > >
> > >
> > > Description
> > >
> > > Google Talk stores all user credentials (username and password) in
> > > clear-text in the process memory. Such vulnerability was found on
> > > August 25, 2005 (two days after the release of Google Talk) and has
> > > already been patched by Google.
> > >
> > > This issue would occur regardless of whether the "Save Password"
> > > feature was enabled or not.
> >
> > The same issue concerns many applications, ie. Gadu-Gadu - another
> > instant messenger. In my opinion such "vulnerabilities" are not worthy
> > publishing (for Gadu-Gadu we have not published this kind of software
> > behaviour) because if you can dump other user process or trick him to
> > execute any code then reading the password from the process memory is
> > only one of many things which you can do.
> >
> > regards,
> > js
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter:
> http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
>
>


--
pagvac (Adrian Pastor)
www.ikwt.com - In Knowledge We Trust


--
pagvac (Adrian Pastor)
www.ikwt.com - In Knowledge We Trust