full-disclosure - Re: Format String Vulnerabilities in Perl Programs

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Message-ID: <Pine.GSO.4.51.0512040147450.8770@cairo.mitre.org>
Date: Sun Dec  4 15:18:34 2005
From: coley at linus.mitre.org (Steven M. Christey)
Subject: Re: Format String Vulnerabilities in Perl
	Programs


It was mentioned this week, but not in my paper, so it didn't hurt for it
to be mentioned again :)

- Steve


On Sun, 4 Dec 2005, Stan Bubrouski wrote:

> On 12/3/05, Michael J. Pomraning <mjp@...urepipe.com> wrote:
> <SNIP>
> > For Perl projects, I'd also nominate syslog(), from the standard Sys::Syslog
> > module, for special attention.  It's common in *NIX environments regardless
> > of programmers' backgrounds and is extremely likely to be called with
> > untrusted data interpolated directly in the format string argument --
> > syslog("info", "A user said $user_input"), for example.
> >
>
> This has been mentioned numerous times, including this week (?), nothing new.
>
> -sb