full-disclosure - Bug with .php extension?

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Message-ID: <F50FBEAD7A52B8468B9F3C875916681A0236ECA7@BXCH2K.bjw2k.asg>
Date: Mon Dec  5 14:56:23 2005
From: tkrpata at bjs.com (Krpata, Tyler)
Subject: Bug with .php extension?

It doesn't seem to matter if the mime type is known or not, for example
foo.php.txt and foo.php.html are both interpreted as PHP scripts on my
test server. (Apache/2.0.54)

-----Original Message-----
From: Stanza [mailto:d.stanzani@...il.com] 
Sent: Monday, December 05, 2005 5:25 AM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Bug with .php extension?

I suppose this is a great bug. It work also on apache 2. If a user can
upload a file and it's extension isn't associated to a mime-type, the
server processes it as a php file..

Stanza
On 12/5/05, Chris Umphress <umphress@...il.com> wrote:
> On 12/4/05, Ron <iago@...hallalegends.com> wrote:
> > I'm not sure whether this is something that's well known, but I've 
> > never seen anything about it, and I nearly got burned by it, so I 
> > figured I'd post it here.
> >
> > In Apache 1.3.33 (untested on any other version), if you have a file

> > called file.php.bak, and you navigate to it in the browser, it will 
> > run on the server as a .php file.  This works with any extension 
> > that isn't known to the server (.rar, .bak, .test, .java, .cpp, .c, 
> > etc.)
> >
> > This can impact upload scripts, if they don't rename.  I had a 
> > script that was only allowing a very limited number of file names, 
> > including .rar.  I realized that I could upload the file 
> > test.php.rar, as demonstrated here:
> > http://www.javaop.com/~iago/test.php.rar
> >
> > (I assure you that that's a .php script, not just that text file).
>
> Whoa, that's interesting. Testing on Apache 2.0.54 gets the same
result.
>
> $ echo "<?php echo 'test'; ?>">/path/to/htdocs/test.php.rar $ wget 
> http://localhost/test.php.rar -O /tmp/test.txt $ cat 
> /tmp/test.text;echo
>
> Prints "test". I hadn't heard about this. Thankfully, my webserver 
> isn't susceptible to such attacks, let me show you why. In my 
> httpd.conf file, I have:
>
> Alias /uploads/ "/var/www/htdocs/"
> Alias /uploads "/var/www/htdocs/"
>
> First, I'm not naming the real directory.... Second, if someone did 
> find the upload directory, they would be redirected to the root of the

> server. They couldn't run the script on my server no matter how hard 
> they tried.
>
> Thanks for the information.
>
> --
> Chris Umphress <http://daga.dyndns.org/> 
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/