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Message-ID: <20051206173531.8FCF71CE304@ws1-6.us4.outblaze.com>
Date: Tue Dec 6 17:35:51 2005
From: jsmith1001 at post.com (John Smith)
Subject: Most common keystroke loggers?
I'm sure there are problems with this, but here's my idea of preventing
improper authentication. At best, I think the attacker would only be able
to DoS the device, or attempt replay - which would fail without the
correct time-delay. I think some kind of two-part blackbox auth with time
delay was what I was trying to get at :)
** = an event
<--> = any traffic that crosses USB peripheral border, ie vulnerable data
[KP] = USB (for instance) input peripheral, with keycode entry pad
[RS] = Remote authentication site
**[KP] is intialized upon deployment like a SecurId. It is synced with
the auth server based on time, and several static algorithms.
**[RS] is on the same time as [KP]
**[RS] knows [KP] time-delay algorithm, and control algorithm, assoc.
w/KPID.
**
>Upon being plugged in, heres what would happen:
[KP] -- Remote auth SYN request, w/encrypted KPID sent --> [RS]
**[RS] determines what time-delay algorithm [KP] is on by KPID. (KPID
encryption is static to all components - possible point of failure.)
[KP] <--------------------- ACK sent back ---------------- [RS]
[KP] <--- Traffic averages analysis between KP and RS ---> [RS]
**[KP] flashes green light to user
**[KP] <-- User enters Keycode ------- [USER]
**[KP] calculates two hashes, based on separate date/time sequence
selected algorithms that are created using the current synced time, and a
unique control algorithm determined during intialization.
[KP] --------- transmits first hash sequence to ---------> [RS]
**[KP] waits x cycles based on a unique time-delay algorithm [RS] knows
by KPID.
[KP] --- transmits second hash sequence to [RS] ---------> [RS]
**[RS] uses earlier traffic analysis to determine an acceptable level of
tolerance for receipt time, and determines consistency with time-delay
algorithm for KPID.
**[RS] authenticates data
[KP] <----- Close session, pass/fail errout to KP -------- [RS]
**[KP] shuts down USB port, no further traffic until reset (several ways
to do that)
[Compromised PC] <------------- Session ------------------ [RS]
What do you think?
--
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