Message-ID: <5ae8cc980601261013t48348a13sf0a999b0e0d1a075@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu Jan 26 18:13:56 2006
From: slamboy at gmail.com (Jason Mayer)
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco VPN
	3000Concentrator Vulnerable to Crafted HTTP Attack

Did you actually read the original post?  It tells you how to get it if you
don't have a cisco service agreement.

On 1/26/06, James Lay <jlay@...ve-tothe-box.net> wrote:
>
> So just for fun, I decided to attempt to get this file with my "guest
> access".  No go....so apparently if I don't have a "Cisco Service
> Agreement", I'm just plain out of luck...even Microsoft has free security
> updates.  Get with it Cisco.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk
> [mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Cisco
> Systems Product Security Incident Response Team
> Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2006 10:00 AM
> To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> Cc: psirt@...co.com
> Subject: [Full-disclosure] Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco VPN
> 3000Concentrator Vulnerable to Crafted HTTP Attack
>
> WARNING: Unsanitized content follows.
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco VPN 3000 Concentrator Vulnerable to Crafted
> HTTP Attack
>
> Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060126-vpn
>
> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060126-vpn.shtml
>
> Revision 1.0
>
> For Public Release 2006 January 26 1700 UTC (GMT)
>
> +--------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Contents
> ========
>
>    Summary
>    Affected Products
>    Details
>    Impact
>    Software Versions and Fixes
>    Workarounds
>    Obtaining Fixed Software
>    Exploitation and Public Announcements
>    Status of This Notice: FINAL
>    Distribution
>    Revision History
>    Cisco Security Procedures
>
> +--------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Summary
> =======
>
> The Cisco VPN 3000 series concentrators are a family of purpose-built,
> remote access Virtual Private Network (VPN) platforms for data encryption
> and authentication.
>
> A malicious user may be able to send a crafted HTTP (Hypertext Transfer
> Protocol) packet to the concentrators which may cause the device to reload
> and drop user connections.
>
> Repeated exploitation of this vulnerability will create a sustained DoS
> (denial of service).
>
> Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for
> affected customers. There are workarounds available to mitigate this
> vulnerability as well.
>
> This advisory is posted at
> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060126-vpn.shtml
>
> Affected Products
> =================
>
> Vulnerable Products
> +------------------
>
> Cisco VPN 3000 series concentrators running software 4.7.0 through 4.7.2.A
> are affected by this vulnerability. This includes version 4.7REL. Software
> versions prior to 4.7.x are not vulnerable.
>
> This series includes models 3005, 3015, 3020, 3030, 3060, and the 3080.
>
> Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
> +--------------------------------
>
> The following products are confirmed not vulnerable:
>
> * Cisco VPN 3002 Hardware Client
> * Cisco IPSec VPN Services Module (VPNSM)
> * Cisco VPN 5000 Concentrators
> * Cisco PIX Firewalls
> * Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA)
> * Any Cisco device that runs Cisco's Internetwork Operating System
>    (IOS)
> * Any Cisco device that runs Cisco's Catalyst Operating System
>    (CatOS)
>
> No other Cisco products are currently known to contain this vulnerability.
>
> Details
> =======
>
> Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a set of rules for exchanging files
> (text, graphic images, sound, video, and other multimedia
> files) on the World Wide Web. HTTP is an application protocol for which
> the
> default TCP port is 80. Due to this vulnerability, a malicious user may
> send
> crafted HTTP packets which may result in a reload of the affected device
> and/or user connections being dropped.
>
> The affected products are only vulnerable if they have the HTTP service
> enabled. By default, HTTP is enabled on VPN 3000 devices, however it may
> be
> manually disabled. Affected devices are not vulnerable to transit traffic,
> only traffic that is destined to them may exploit this vulnerability.
>
> To check if the HTTP service is enabled, please do the following:
>
> 1. Check the configuration on the device to verify the status of the
>    HTTP service.
> 2. Try to connect to the device using a standard web browser that
>    supports using a URL similar to http://ip_address_of_device/.
>
> This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug Toolkit as Bug ID
> CSCsb77324.
>
> Impact
> ======
>
> Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a reload of
> the
> affected device and user connections being dropped.
>
> Repeated exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a sustained
> Denial of Service.
>
> Software Versions and Fixes
> ===========================
>
> Cisco VPN 3000 series software version 4.7.2.B and later is not
> vulnerable.
>
> Cisco VPN 3000 series users can upgrade to version 4.7.2.B or later
> software
> to resolve this vulnerability. Cisco VPN 3000 software is available for
> download at http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/vpn3000-3des
>
> When considering software upgrades, also consult
> http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
> exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
>
> In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices
> to
> be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and
> software
> configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release.
> If
> the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance
> Center
> (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
>
> Workarounds
> ===========
>
> Disable HTTP
> +-----------
>
> Disabling HTTP will effectively mitigate this vulnerability.
>
> With HTTP disabled, the concentrator can be configured to use HTTPS
> (HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure) for both concentrator management and
> WebVPN connectivity if WebVPN connectivity is configured on the
> concentrator.
>
> To implement this workaround, first enable HTTPS, then disable HTTP.
>
> If WebVPN is used, it is important to also disable any HTTP proxys that
> may
> be configured (HTTPS is always enabled for WebVPN if WebVPN is enabled)
>
> For details on how to enable HTTPS management of the concentrator, please
> reference:
>
> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2284/
> products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00803ee1e4.html#wp1309312
>
> For details on how to disable HTTP management of the concentrator, please
> reference:
>
> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2284/
> products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00803ee11f.html#wp999607
>
> For details on how to disable WebVPN HTTP proxies please see:
>
> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2284/
> products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00803ee1e4.html#wp1400335
>
> Infrastructure ACLs
> +------------------
>
> HTTP to the VPN3000 could be blocked as part of a Infrastructure ACL on
> screening routers, switches and firewalls controlling all access to the
> trusted network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered a network security
> best
> practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network
> security, as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The
> white
> paper entitled "Protecting Your
> Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines
> and recommended deployment techniques:
>
> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/
> technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml
>
> Obtaining Fixed Software
> ========================
>
> Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for
> affected customers. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
> their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
> compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
>
> Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
> have
> purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such
> software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's
> software license terms found at
> http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html
> or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
> http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
>
> Do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or "security-alert@...co.com"
> for software upgrades.
>
> Customers with Service Contracts
> +-------------------------------
>
> Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
> regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
> should
> be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at
> http://www.cisco.com.
>
> Customers using Third-party Support Organizations
> +------------------------------------------------
>
> Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or
> existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
> Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
> support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate
> course
> of action in regards to this advisory.
>
> The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
> customer
> situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and
> organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and
> releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support
> organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most
> appropriate
> for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
>
> Customers without Service Contracts
> +----------------------------------
>
> Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
> service
> contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
> unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
> should
> get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center
> (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
>
> * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
> * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
> * e-mail: tac@...co.com
>
> Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice
> as
> evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for
> non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
>
> Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
> for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
> telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
> languages.
>
> Exploitation and Public Announcements
> =====================================
>
> The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the vulnerability
> described in this advisory.
>
> This issue was discussed at the Schmoocon security conference on January
> 12th, 2006.
>
> Status of This Notice: FINAL
> ============================
>
> THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND
> OF
> GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
> FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT
> OR
> MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE
> RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
>
> A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
> the
> distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may
> lack important information or contain factual errors.
>
> Distribution
> ============
>
> This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060126-vpn.shtml
>
> In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
> clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
> e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
>
> * cust-security-announce@...co.com
> * first-teams@...st.org
> * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
> * vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
> * cisco@...t.colorado.edu
> * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
> * full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com
>
> Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
> worldwide
> website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
> newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
> above URL for any updates.
>
> Revision History
> ================
>
> +---------------------------------------+
> | Revision |                 | Initial  |
> | 1.0      | 26-January-2006 | public   |
> |          |                 | release. |
> +---------------------------------------+
>
> Cisco Security Procedures
> =========================
>
> Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
> products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to
> receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide
> website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/
> products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
> This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
> notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
> http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
>
> +--------------------------------------------------------------------
>
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