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Message-ID: <4415E244.1010401@snosoft.com>
Date: Mon Mar 13 21:21:19 2006
From: simon at snosoft.com (Simon Smith)
Subject: HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall.

Ok,
    That or the auth mechanism does need to be changed.

Jeremy Bishop wrote:
> On Monday 13 March 2006 12:37, you wrote:
>   
>> List,
>>     SSL is not a fix for the problem, SSL is just a way of evading
>> the issue or hiding the hole. I can bypass SSL with a man in the
>> middle attack (which I've already done several times). Once I bypass
>>     
>
> I'm assuming that this is using unsigned or otherwise invalid 
> certificates, and relying on user ignorance or apathy to succeed.
>
>   
>>     What is the solution to this problem? Is there a solution that
>> does not require a different auth type?
>>     
>
> SSL.  (Done correctly.)
>
> Any "solution" is likely to rely on public-key crypto and as such will 
> require a similar mechanism for verifying identity.  If sufficiently 
> widespread, apathy and ignorance will render it vulnerable to the exact 
> same problems.
>
> I suggest "password-authenticated key agreement" as a starting point for 
> research outside the traditional public-key methods.  (Although, as far 
> as I can tell, it would require the "password" to be accessible to the 
> server so that the session can be set up.  IOW, you get around the 
> problems of trusting a cert, but you're back to storing passwords in 
> plaintext.)
>
> Jeremy
>
>   


-- 


Regards, 
	Adriel T. Desautels
	Harvard Security Group
	http://www.harvardsecuritygroup.com


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