full-disclosure - HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall.

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Message-ID: <200603151636.k2FGaAAW018493@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Wed Mar 15 16:36:18 2006
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall. 

On Wed, 15 Mar 2006 10:14:23 EST, Simon Smith said:
>     I think that we've lost focus of my original question. My question
> refined is, does anyone else agree with me that using HTTP BASIC AUTH
> for important applications is a security risk/vulnerability (regardless
> of SSL)? Or, is everyone here telling me that they "feel safe" if the
> connections are SSL'ed and are not worried that the HTTP BASIC AUTH is
> only creating a base64 hash of their usernames and passwords that can
> easily be reversed? My personal opinion, I feel like we're painting over
> the rust on an old car... I don't feel like we're fixing the risks.

It's not bulletproof.  There are holes.

Having said that, remember two things:

1) Once you're doing BASIC over SSL, it requires a MITM attack.  In most
network configs, that means that the attacker needs to already control at
least one *other* box on the wire.  At that point, you have bigger problems.

2) BASIC AUTH over SSL isn't the weak point, especially if the source box is
a Windows box with 57 different kinds of spyware and backdoors on it.  If the
endpoints aren't secure, you can't *really* secure the path between them.  This
is also why using SSL on your e-commerce site doesn't mean it's secure - it
merely guarantees that the data isn't screwed with on its way to the server,
where it will likely get dumped into a world-readable file for the benefit of
the first guy to try anonymous FTP to the site because the FTP server doesn't
chroot an anonymous connection....
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