full-disclosure - HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall

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Message-ID: <242a0a8f0603151214x39627a7fq99666a0fb3fc1090@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu Mar 16 09:52:19 2006
From: eaton.lists at gmail.com (Brian Eaton)
Subject: HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall

tim-security at sentinelchicken.org wrote:
>> (assuming the admin doesn't notice the cert changes and all that good
>> stuff.)

> There's your problem.  If you assume this, you will always be vulnerable
> to MitM if the software you're using allows you to communicate anyway.

> If you're SSH client lets you connect to systems whose keys have
> changed, same problem.  If your VPN client allows it, same problem.

> This is why I wanted you to think about what you are trusting in the
> first place.  You are trusting your CA and the certificate chain.  If
> you can't do that, then you have no trust.

How trustworthy are the CA certificates included in the average browser?

There are a couple of dozen CA certificates shipped with my browser.
Some of the vendors associated with these CA certificates offer to
give me a certificate for my web site in 10 minutes or less for a
couple of hundred dollars.

This sounds like a really ripe opportunity for social engineering to me.

- Brian