full-disclosure - HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Thu Mar 16 20:50:58 2006
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall 

On Thu, 16 Mar 2006 15:10:50 EST, Brian Eaton said:

> My read of that statement is that Geotrust sees nothing wrong with
> their verification process and is not going to take any action to
> prevent this from happening again.
> 
> The incentives for the CAs are in all the wrong places.  They suffer
> no financial harm when they certify a false identity.  Instead, they
> make a quick buck.

It's more subtle than that.

Geotrust didn't do *anything* wrong.  They issued a cert for www.mountain-america.net
to the rightful owners of www.mountain-america.net.  There's no reason to raise
a flag here, as nothing nefarious has happened.  They're not up for a financial hit
for certifying a false identity, because they certified the real identity
correctly, as per their procedures.

There's little to nothing that Geotrust can do about the fact that after they
properly certified mountain-america.net, it turned around and pretended to be
mntamerica.net.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 228 bytes
Desc: not available
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20060316/e73a511c/attachment.bin