[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <200603172129.k2HLTm4U022212@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Fri Mar 17 21:31:02 2006
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: Re: Re: -ADVISORY- % =Thu Mar 16 13:23:37 EST
2006=%Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Access
On Fri, 17 Mar 2006 20:14:35 GMT, Dave Korn said:
> Ah, well, that wasn't exactly obvious from the Received header that you
> posted, now was it?! Heh, that was one vital piece of info without which
> nobody could be sure they understood exactly what it was that you were
> showing us. I thought it might have been a quote from one of the headers of
> one of the spams!
Actually, the fact that the Received: header showed that the toad.com machine
accepted the mail, combined with the fact that it then forwarded the mail
to the list (else we'd not have *seen* the Received: in question), combine to
tell us one of 3 things:
1) Somebody telnet'ed to the *next* machine's port 25 and forged that Received:
line (somewhat unlikely, as that box said 'received from toad.com'). Of course,
you can only *really* trust headers added by boxes you control, but in this case
things look fairly kosher up to where lists.grok.org.uk accepts the mail, and
there's no obvious reason to disbelieve its Received: line.
2) The entity giving it to toad.com performed some variant of SMTP AUTH,
convincing toad.com they were a legitimate user and allowed to relay outbound.
3) It's an open relay/proxy.
Incidentally, the single Received: line I posted was actually for the
German Tor box rather than toad.com. :)
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 228 bytes
Desc: not available
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20060317/560fcdef/attachment.bin
Powered by blists - more mailing lists