Message-ID: <020101c65054$73ffd9a0$1204a8c0@intranet.aspectsecurity.com>
Date: Sat Mar 25 23:13:07 2006
From: jeff.williams at owasp.org (Jeff Williams)
Subject: RE: 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability,
	Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile,
	and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

Great topics.

I'm a huge fan of sandboxes, but Dinis is right, the market hasn't really
gotten there yet. No question that it would help if it was possible to run
complex software like a browser inside a sandbox that restricted its ability
to do bad things, even if there are vulnerabilities (or worse -- malicious
code) in them.   I'm terrified about the epidemic use of libraries that are
just downloaded from wherever (in both client and server applications). All
that code can do *whatever* it wants in your environments folks!

Sandboxes are finally making some headway. Most of the Java application
servers (Tomcat included) now run with their sandbox enabled (albeit with a
weak policy). And I think the Java Web Start system also has the sandbox
enabled.  So maybe we're making progress.

But, if you've ever tried to configure the Java security policy file, use
JAAS, or implement the SecurityManager interface, you know that it's *way*
too hard to implement a tight policy this way.  You end up granting all
kinds of privileges because it's too difficult to do it right.  And only the
developer of the software could reasonably attempt it, which is backwards,
because it's the *user* who really needs it right.  Also, applications don't
fail nicely when security exceptions are generated, so it's not like you can
really just slap a sandbox around an application you download and run it.

It's possible that sandboxes are going the way of multilevel security (MLS).
A sort of ivory tower idea that's too complex to implement or use. But it
seems like a really good idea that we should try to make practical. But even
if they do start getting used, we can't just give up on getting software
developers to produce secure code.  There will always be security problems
that sandboxes designed for the platform cannot help with.

I'm with Dinis that the only way to get people to care is to fix the
externalities in the software market and put the burden on those who can
most easily avoid the costs -- the people who build the software. Maybe then
the business case will be more clear.

(Your last point about non-verified MSIL is terrifying. I can't think of any
reason why you would want to turn off verification -- except perhaps startup
speed. But that's a terrible tradeoff.)

--Jeff
http://www.owasp.org


> -----Original Message-----
> From: owasp-leaders-admin@...ts.sourceforge.net [mailto:owasp-leaders-
> admin@...ts.sourceforge.net] On Behalf Of Dinis Cruz
> Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2006 6:39 AM
> To: 'owasp-dotnet@...ts.sourceforge.net'; webappsec@...urityfocus.com; SC-
> L@...urecoding.org; full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> Cc: xforce@....net
> Subject: [OWASP-LEADERS] 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs
IE
> security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed
> Verifiable code
> 
> Another day, and another unmanaged-code remote command execution in IE.
> 
> What is relevant in the ISS alert (see end of this post) is that IE 7
> beta 2 is also vulnerable, which leads me to this post's questions:
> 
> 1) Will IE 7.0 be more secure than IE 6.0 (i.e. will after 2 years it
> being released the number of exploits and attacks be smaller than today?
> and will it be a trustworthy browser?)
> 
> 2) Given that Firefox is also build on unmanaged code, isn't Firefox as
> insecure as IE and as dangerous
> 
> 3) Since my assets as a user exist in user land, isn't the risk profile
> of malicious unmanaged code (deployed via IE/Firefox) roughly the same
> if I am running as a 'low privileged' user or as administrator? (at the
> end of the day, in both cases the malicious code will still be able to:
> access my files, access all websites that I have stored credentials in
> my browser (cookies or username / passwords pairs), access my VPNs,
> attack other computers on the local network, install key loggers,
> establish two way communication with a Internet based boot net, etc ...
> (basically everything except rooting the boot, disabling AVs and
> installing persistent hooks (unless of course this malicious code
> executes a successful escalation of privilege attack)))
> 
> 4) Finally, isn't the solution for the creation of secure and
> trustworthy Internet Browsing environments the development of browsers
> written in 100% managed and verifiable code, which execute on a secure
> and very restricted Partially Trusted Environments? (under .Net, Mono or
> Java). This way, the risk of buffer overflows will be very limited, and
> when logic or authorization vulnerabilities are discovered in this
> 'Partially Trusted IE' the 'Secure Partially Trusted environment' will
> limit what the malicious code (i.e. the exploit) can do.
> 
> This last question/idea is based on something that I have been defending
> for quite a while now (couple years) which is: "Since it is impossible
> to create bug/vulnerability free code, our best solution to create
> securer and safer computing environments (compared to the ones we have
> today), is to execute those applications in sandboxed environments".
> 
> Basically we need to be able to safely handle malicious code, executed
> in our user's session, in a web server, in a database engine, etc... Our
> current security model is based on the concept of preventing malicious
> code from being executed (something which is becoming more and more
> impossible to do) versus the model of 'malicious payload containment'
> (i.e. Sandboxing).
> 
> And in my view, creating sandboxes for unmanaged code is very hard or
> even impossible (at least in the current Windows Architecture), so the
> only solution that I am seeing at the moment is to create sandboxes for
> managed and verifiable code.
> 
> Fortunately, both .Net and Java have architectures that allow the
> creation of these 'secure' environments (CAS and Security Manager).
> 
> Unfortunately, today there is NO BUSINESS case to do this. The paying
> customers are not demanding products that don't have the ability to
> 'own' their data center, software companies don't want to invest in the
> development of such applications, nobody is liable for anything,
> malicious attackers have not exploited this insecure software
> development and deployment environment (they have still too much to
> money to harvest via Spyware/Spam) and the Framework developers
> (Microsoft, Sun, Novell, IBM, etc...) don't want to rock the boat and
> explain their to their clients that they should be demanding (and only
> paying for) applications that can be safely executed in their corporate
> environment (i.e. ones where malicious activities are easily detectable,
> preventable and contained (something which I believe we only have a
> chance of doing with managed and verifiable code)).
> 
> I find ironic the fact that Microsoft now looks at Oracle and says 'We
> are so much better than them on Security', when the reason why Oracle
> has not cared (so far) about security is the same why Microsoft doesn't
> make any serious efforts to promote and develop Partially Trusted .Net
> applications: There is no business case for both. Btw, if Microsoft
> publicly admitted that the current application development practices of
> ONLY creating Full Trust code IS A MASSIVE PROBLEM, and if Microsoft
> spent considerable resources and focus in turning that boat around, the
> resulting 'partially trusted application' environment (which could then
> be enforced by default to all locally executed code) would have more
> impact in creating a secure and trustworthy computing environment that
> all LUAs and UACs put together :)
> 
> Finally, you might have noticed that whenever I talked about 'managed
> code', I mentioned 'managed and verifiable code', the reason for this
> distinction, is that I discovered recently that .Net code executed under
> Full Trust  can not be (or should not be) called 'managed code', since
> the .Net Framework will not verify that code (because it is executed
> under Full Trust). This means that I can write MSIL code which breaks
> type safety and execute it without errors in a Full Trust .Net
environment.
> 
> ...in the hope that somebody is listening ....
> 
> Best regards
> 
> Dinis Cruz
> Owasp .Net Project
> www.owasp.net
> 
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject:     ISS ProIStection Brief: Microsoft IE createTextRange()
> Remote Command Execution
> Date:     Fri, 24 Mar 2006 14:55:42 -0500 (EST)
> From:     X-Force <xforce@....net>
> To:     alert@....net
> 
> 
> 
> Internet Security Systems Protection Alert
> March 24, 2006
> 
> Microsoft IE createTextRange() Remote Command Execution
> 
> Version: 1.0
> 
> 
> Summary:
> A vulnerability was reported in the way Microsoft Internet Explorer
> handles unexpected method calls.  Exploitation of this vulnerability
> could lead to remote code execution under the security context of the user
> viewing a malicious web page.
> 
> Description:
> Internet Explorer does not properly handle the createTextRange()
> method when invoked on a checkbox object.  Because of this, a call is
> made to a predictable location in memory.  An attacker can easily
> fill this predictable location in memory with malicious code to
> be executed.
> 
> Business Impact:
> Compromise of the operating system can lead to exposure of
> confidential information, loss of productivity, and further network
> compromise. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could
> be used to gain unauthorized access to one.s networks and machines.
> 
> Affected Products:
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0 SP1
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 Beta 2
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows 95
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows 98
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows 98 Second Edition
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows Me
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows XP
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows 2000 Any version
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows 2003 Any version
> .    Microsoft Corporation: Windows NT 4.0
> ___________________________________________________________________
> ___
> 
> About Internet Security Systems, Inc.
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> 
> Copyright (c) 2006 Internet Security Systems, Inc. All rights reserved
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