full-disclosure - 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

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Message-ID: <200603260225.k2Q2PgNZ018559@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Sun Mar 26 03:25:58 2006
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability,
	Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile,
	and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code 

On Sat, 25 Mar 2006 11:39:19 GMT, Dinis Cruz said:

> Finally, you might have noticed that whenever I talked about 'managed
> code', I mentioned 'managed and verifiable code', the reason for this
> distinction, is that I discovered recently that .Net code executed under
> Full Trust  can not be (or should not be) called 'managed code', since
> the .Net Framework will not verify that code (because it is executed
> under Full Trust). This means that I can write MSIL code which breaks
> type safety and execute it without errors in a Full Trust .Net environment.

I'm not sure which is stronger at the moment, the "that's scary" implications
or the "why did they *bother*?" implications....
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