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Message-ID: <ccee4b0a0603311623k357647cey44ba67e798d33614@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat Apr 1 01:23:51 2006
From: duckhacks at gmail.com (John Doe)
Subject: Re: RSA HAVE CRACKED PHISHING, NO SERIOUSLY
> In any case, it's clear that the person who posted that response has *no
> idea*
> how most bank's anti-fraud systems work.
>
> First off, the phishers *can't* just run through all the data they've
> gotten
> in just a few seconds, unless they distributed the work across a bunch of
> botnet
> zombies - hits for more than a few dozen different accounts from the same
> IP
> in the same timespan are suspicious at the very least.
>
> Secondly, the phishers can currently usually be sure that the victims have
> given them reasonably good data (unless the victim is a dweeb who can't
> enter
> their DoB or account number correctly). On the other hand, if the phished
> data
> has been polluted by 90% bad data, then only 1 of 10 attempted
> transactions
> will succeed - and the fact that they're trying lots of different bad data
> will
> again hopefully trigger an alert. If you only succeed every 10th time,
> and you
> get locked out after 3 attempts with different bad data, it's going to
> take you
> a lot longer to figure out which ones are good and which ones are bad....
Consider that some of these fake accounts could also be used as Honey keys.
They would of course have to work in conjunction with the banks /
sites to utilize this.
It would be rather difficult for a phisher to sort through thousands
of Id's when IP addresses keep getting shut off based on a Honey Key.
You would have to own a lot of BOTs and a lot of patience.
Duck
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