full-disclosure - [Apparmor-dev] Re: Re: [SC-L] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions:Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

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Message-ID: <443AEA17.2090406@novell.com>
Date: Tue Apr 11 02:59:45 2006
From: crispin at novell.com (Crispin Cowan)
Subject: [Apparmor-dev] Re: Re: [SC-L] Re: [Owasp-dotnet]
	RE: 4 Questions:Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs
	Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

Brian Eaton wrote:
> Does cap_setuid give a program enough authority to break out of the
> AppArmor profile?
>   
No, cap_setuid is not sufficient. In fact, being full root is not
sufficient to break out of AppArmor confinement. Rood daemons being one
of the greatest threats to the system, AppArmor would not be very useful
if it could not confine root.

Crispin
-- 
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.                      http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/
Director of Software Engineering, Novell  http://novell.com