Message-ID: <OF28D994F2.419CF579-ON8525715A.0072E22A-0725715A.0074F0AE@rapid7.com>
Date: Tue Apr 25 01:53:49 2006
From: advisory at rapid7.com (advisory@...id7.com)
Subject: Rapid7 Advisory R7-0022: Symantec Scan Engine
 Known Immutable DSA Private Key

_______________________________________________________________________
                     Rapid7, LLC Security Advisory
_______________________________________________________________________

Rapid7 Advisory R7-0022
Symantec Scan Engine Known Immutable DSA Private Key

   Published:  April 21, 2006
   Revision:   1.0
   http://www.rapid7.com/advisories/R7-0022.html

   CVE: CVE-2006-0231

1. Affected system(s):

   KNOWN VULNERABLE:
    o Symantec Scan Engine v5.0.0.24

   KNOWN FIXED:
    o Symantec Scan Engine v5.1.0.7

   UNKNOWN (PROBABLY VULNERABLE):
    o All v5.0.x.x
    o Earlier versions

2. Summary

   Symantec Scan Engine exhibits a vulnerability in the way it
   generates the SSL private key used for protecting communications
   over TCP port 8005. This port is used to exchange sensitive
   configuration and control commands between the server and the
   administrative control application.

   While all data over this port is protected using SSL, Rapid7 has
   found that every installation of Symantec Scan Engine uses the same
   private DSA key. This immutable key cannot be changed by end users
   and can be extracted easily from any installation of this product.

   This design flaw renders the SSL protection useless. A
   man-in-the-middle attacker could easily intercept and decrypt all
   communications between Symantec Scan Engine and an administrative
   client.

   NeXpose, Rapid7's award-winning vulnerability assessment platform,
   checks for this vulnerability and other vulnerabilities we have
   discovered in Symantec Scan Engine. Visit http://www.rapid7.com
   to register for a free demo of NeXpose.

3. Vendor status and information

   Symantec Corporation
   http://www.symantec.com

   Symantec was notified of this vulnerability on January 17, 2006.
   They acknowledged the vulnerability, then provided us with a
   fixed version. Rapid7's advisory was publicly released on April 21,
   2006.

4. Solution

   Upgrade to Symantec Scan Engine v5.1.0.7 or later.

5. Detailed analysis

   Symantec Scan Engine's administrative client exchanges sensitive
   configuration information with the server using a proprietary
   protocol protected by SSL which runs by default on TCP port 8005.
   This built-in SSL server is used, for example, to transmit the
   administrator password hash when changing the password. It is
   crucial for this communication channel to remain private,
   authenticated, and reliable.

   A critical design error has been made in the way SSL protection is
   employed. The use of a particular DSA private key, pre-generated by
   Symantec, is enforced in their SSL server in all tested versions of
   Symantec Scan Engine. End users are offered no way to change the key,
   and the key itself can be relatively easily extracted from any
   installation. The key can be found in the file "servers.jar"
   (located by default in "C:\Program Files\Symantec\Scan Engine"),
   which contains a java keystore file "com/symantec/jsse/serverKeys"
   protected by the password "secret". The key entry is stored under
   the alias "server" and is protected by the password "secret".

   This known immutable key renders SSL protection useless since the
   private key is known to anybody (see below for the key in PEM
   format). All Scan Engine installations use the same key. For example,
   attackers can combine ARP or DNS spoofing attacks with the knowledge
   of the private key to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks.

   -----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   MIIBuwIBAAKBgQD9f1OBHXUSKVLfSpwu7OTn9hG3UjzvRADDHj+AtlEmaUVdQCJR
   +1k9jVj6v8X1ujD2y5tVbNeBO4AdNG/yZmC3a5lQpaSfn+gEexAiwk+7qdf+t8Yb
   +DtX58aophUPBPuD9tPFHsMCNVQTWhaRMvZ1864rYdcq7/IiAxmd0UgBxwIVAJdg
   UI8VIwvMspK5gqLrhAvwWBz1AoGBAPfhoIXWmz3ey7yrXDa4V7l5lK+7+jrqgvlX
   TAs9B4JnUVlXjrrUWU/mcQcQgYC0SRZxI+hMKBYTt88JMozIpuE8FnqLVHyNKOCj
   rh4rs6Z1kW6jfwv6ITVi8ftiegEkO8yk8b6oUZCJqIPf4VrlnwaSi2ZegHtVJWQB
   TDv+z0kqAoGAE9rKDKa4eOROFXX1/jy7sLH34OGTbTmsqYoEBTJt8DolJkr6L4kf
   SyOzpIhKB440mmXZMQJbXy0WNBCGzPjq6OHpI60KuBTskWAtPBEGE1jiov/7jK9b
   wCt6sTBqo3Ux5ygyjuFQyt89d+qTp9761Z32OvaBq+IJvZYWNM8M/2ECFDLgCI85
   fJtA3mlq9Q1T6U36Kl7x
   -----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----

   The private component of this DSA key is X:

   X = 0x32e0088f397c9b40de696af50d53e94dfa2a5ef1

   A tool such as ssldump can be used to confirm the validity of the
   private key as shown above, by manually comparing its public part to
   the DSA public key embedded in the SSL server's certificate
   displayed by ssldump.

6. Credit

   This vulnerability was discovered by Marc Bevand of Rapid7.

7. Contact Information

   Rapid7, LLC
   Email: advisory@...id7.com
   Web: http://www.rapid7.com
   Phone: +1 (617) 247-1717

8. Disclaimer and Copyright

   Rapid7, LLC is not responsible for the misuse of the information
   provided in our security advisories. These advisories are a service
   to the professional security community. There are NO WARRANTIES with
   regard to this information. Any application or distribution of this
   information constitutes acceptance AS IS, at the user's own risk.
   This information is subject to change without notice.

   This advisory Copyright (C) 2006 Rapid7, LLC. Permission is hereby
   granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no changes are
   made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers remain intact.

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