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Message-ID: <20060426192701.BF2E47B5BD@ws5-10.us4.outblaze.com>
Date: Wed Apr 26 20:28:08 2006
From: crypticmauler at linuxmail.org (CrYpTiC MauleR)
Subject: Should I Be Worried?

Forgot to say that the VP of Software Dev who is in charge of the site said he would do an emergency fix in 6 hours to fix the problem. As I expected the problem is still there. Either he is a moron and didn't understand me or they just tried to give the impression they were fixing it. So sad to say site is still vuln, reason thinking public spotlight will make them get off their ass and actually do something productive to protect student information. At this point I can not trust the IT staff because on 2 occasions the VPs of 2 departments lied to me about fixing the hole. I've contacted the Department Of Higher Education and will be filing a complaint against the school. Not only is their lack of concern about the problem disturbing, their IT administration seems to be unqualified to deal with it either.


> ----- Original Message -----
> From: bkfsec <bkfsec@....lonestar.org>
> To: "CrYpTiC MauleR" <crypticmauler@...uxmail.org>
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Should I Be Worried?
> Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 15:04:04 -0400
> 
> 
> CrYpTiC MauleR wrote:
> 
> > After reading http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11389 it made me 
> > think twice about actually going public with my school's security 
> > hole by having school notify students, parents and/or faculty at 
> > risk due to it.
> >
> > I mean I didnt access any records, just knew that it was possible 
> > for someone to access my account or anyone elses. I did not even 
> > exploit the hole to steal, modify etc any records. Does this 
> > still put me in the same boat at the USC guy? If so I am really 
> > not wanting to butt heads with the school in case they try to 
> > turn around and bite the hand that tried to help them. Even if my 
> > intentions were good, they might even make something up saying I 
> > accessed entire database or something. I have nothing to prove me 
> > otherwise since they have access to the logs. Already it seems 
> > like the school is trying to sweep the incident under the rug, so 
> > very wary as to what they might do if they were pushed into a 
> > corner and forced to go public. Anyone has any idea what I can do 
> > or should I just let this slide? I am already putting my credit 
> > report and such on fraud alert just in case, and definelty do not 
> > plan on attending this school after my degree or school year is 
> > over. A transfer is better than having me risk my data.
> >
> >
> >
> 
> I think you're probably jumping the gun a little bit here.
> 
>  From what I gather, you approached people about the issue, you got 
> some resolution on it.  Switching schools is not necessarily going 
> to help you because, believe me, every institution has problems 
> with regard to information leakage.  If it's not technical, it's 
> social leakage.  If you're concerned about possible problems to 
> yourself, then maybe full disclosure may not be appropriate. Think 
> about it for a second.  Holes in both software and procedures are 
> fixed daily in any given institution. The *vast* majority of it is 
> never reported.  And what would we really gain if it was?  School A 
> fixes an XSS bug in their web app.  Woopty freaking doooo...  
> School B patches their servers 2 months late, but are now up to 
> date... School C fires a registrar for giving out SS numbers over 
> the phone to unknown contacts, but not necessarily known to be 
> malicious... etc
> 
> Without proof of a violation of security or privacy, it doesn't 
> really mean much.  Just having a social security number these days 
> is grounds for people to be concerned.  This is why it was 
> originally against mandate for it to be used as a national ID 
> system.
> 
> In fact, let's take that one step further and look at the whole 
> financial infrastructure.  It's a shambles.  Not secure at all.  
> Anyone with the right contract can pull your credit report and 
> start adding accounts to your name. Be afraid, be very afraid.  
> But, be afraid for the right reasons.  Really, the only reason you 
> should be thinking full disclosure now is if they didn't fix the 
> bug, which IIRC they did.  If you're really concerned about your 
> privacy, that should be where it stops.  Full disclosure after 
> fixes works with software components, not necessarily 
> organizations.  Society as a whole is not necessarily going to 
> learn anything from relatively generic examples of institutions 
> having a security issue (which we don't even have proof of any 
> exploit of those issues). So best thing to do is back off for a 
> bit, lay low... you got a response, why keep putting yourself in 
> the spotlight and drawing them to you?  Organizations threaten 
> legal action, more often than not, to shut people up.  Just 
> consider that if that's what you're concerned about.  Be subtle.
> 
>                 -bkfsec

>


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