full-disclosure - Five Ways to Screw Up SSL

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Message-ID: <4471B4F7.2050500@csuohio.edu>
Date: Mon May 22 13:58:13 2006
From: michael.holstein at csuohio.edu (Michael Holstein)
Subject: Five Ways to Screw Up SSL

> Why would it matter who signed it? As long as the data is encrypted as
> it travels over the internet, I am happy.

Because encrypted is only half the battle. Trusting that $entity is 
really $entity is the other half.

Most end-users aren't smart enough to verify that when they hit 
https://www.chase.com (or whatever) that the other end really *is* Chase 
-- that's what they pay Verisign for -- because we have at least *some* 
faith that Verisign took the time to ensure they issued it to the right 
person.

Nevermind that certificates get issued to things like chase-inc.com and 
the wrong people. That's another problem.

/mike.