full-disclosure - Five Ways to Screw Up SSL

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Message-ID: <4471BC98.5000800@csuohio.edu>
Date: Mon May 22 14:30:39 2006
From: michael.holstein at csuohio.edu (Michael Holstein)
Subject: Five Ways to Screw Up SSL

> I was referring to the CA that signs it. It was implied that
> freessl.com, who gives out trial certificates, is an unreliable CA. I
> do not understand why their certs would be any less valid than
> anothers.

Not less valid, less trusted. SSL is a heirarchical "web of trust".

> As long as the website listed on the cert is the website you are
> visiting, why should it matter who issued the cert?

Because how can I know that a certificate issued to "A" is really entity 
"A", unless I trust a central authority to do the homework.

Phishing attacks love this trick. If anybody could get a cert for 
"www.chase.com" that was valid to the browser, then anybody that could 
do DNS foo to the client could spoof the real Chase.

/mike.