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Message-ID: <44B39738.7020301@heapoverflow.com>
Date: Tue Jul 11 13:19:45 2006
From: ad at heapoverflow.com (ad@...poverflow.com)
Subject: Fuzzing Microsoft Office

and ? what does your post introduce new ??? nothing new-bie....

 >it has been noticed that people fuzzing the documents and
 >afterwards they don't know which type of error it is.

they = kcope , you , and some around there , those posting some crap POC 
on FD without to know what they did really found (exploitable or not , 
you arent able determine the severity yourself .whah), without informing 
MS , kids.  Hopefully , the largest part of the security workers aren't 
so "mongol" than you.

Bye



naveed wrote:
> Last friday I have posted a POC regarding the microsoft office mso.dll
> boundary condition error, i have checked the code flow of mso_203 and
> it was producing access violation errors which i have sent to bugtraq
> and FD , microsoft's MSRC blog has been updated at
> http://blogs.technet.com/msrc/archive/2006/07/10/441006.aspx  stating
> that the vulnerability is not remotely exploitable , that is true.
> However while checking a bunch of fuzzed documents several other
> problems have been noticed, even other people have reported the issues
> with different office applications. Some of them were able to
> reproduce the issue and they are exploitable others may not be.
> Microsoft Office vulnerabilities are not new but recently interest is
> increased , it has been noticed that people fuzzing the documents and
> afterwards they don't know which type of error it is or whether the
> vulnerability is exploitable or not !!. Just note how many 0-days have
> been reported in the past few months in MS Office products. It is
> interesting to see that most of these vulnerabilities are directly or
> indirectly related to fuzzing and or changing the normal behavior of
> documents.
>
> If we take the example of this recently discovered HLINK.DLL buffer
> overflow flaw , the kcope who reported it used the Perl's Excel
> worksheet generator to generate a long URL string in the worksheet,
> interestingly Microsoft Office does not allow you to generate the
> hyperlinks with such long strings (usually restricted to 256 bytes) ,
> even the OLE automation restricts you but the Microsoft's binary file
> format does not have such restrictions for "hyperlink" objects, maybe
> it was assumed that library is safe since office is not allowing the
> users to have such nasty url's.
>
> The problem of generating the specially crafted files is not a big
> issue, it was assumed that one should know the binary file format in
> order to generate some "valid document" (one which is parsable by the
> applications), but the Perl's library is just an example, nanika
> posted another style sheet flaw in ms excel which looks like the
> result of an exercise with same library.
>
> Few days back the same exploit was released for MS Word , it is also
> interesting that 3rd party libraries are not that much restrictive
> when producing the MS Office compatible files, they allow you to do
> some really funny stuff. For example it is an open question that why
> OpenOffice developer's decided to accept a url string of say 20,000
> bytes (perhaps of indefinite length) ?? One can easily identify some
> new problems while experimenting this stuff.
>
>
> ---------------------
> Naveed Afzal
>
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