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Message-ID: <20060713080053.52948.qmail@web60622.mail.yahoo.com>
Date: Thu Jul 13 09:01:00 2006
From: lise_moorveld at yahoo.com (Lise Moorveld)
Subject: MIMESweeper For Web 5.X Cross Site Scripting
Hi,
In my opinion, there are two possibilities... the
injected code is executed in the context of the banned
website, or the injected code is executed in the
context of the "Access denied"-page served by
MIMESweeper.
The latter would be the case if MIMESweeper redirects
to a page of its own, the former would be the case if
MIMESweeper replaced the content of the reply of the
webserver of the denied website with it's "Access
denied"-message.
Unfortunately I don't have MIMESweeper around to test
this, but maybe someone else can verify this?
If the latter scenario is true and the code is
executed in the context of the MIMESweeper website AND
there is a web-based admin-interface running on the
same domain... this issue may allow attackers to
obtain access to the admin-interface...
- Lise
--- Erez Metula <erezmetula@...ecure.co.il> wrote:
> Hi Brian,
> Please consider those attack scenarios:
>
> 1. Stealing user cookie. Since it requires that the
> client should
> already have such a cookie, it requires that the
> client visit the banned
> site first. This situation is minimized to the time
> window in which the
> user is logged in and the site got banned. Can
> happen in 2 situations:
> 1. The product blacklist file is updated
> (automatically, on a
> daily basis) with the added blacklisted site.
> 2. The administrator adds the specific site to the
> blacklist
> file.
> The attacker will make the product / administrator
> believe that a site
> should be blacklisted - even a short period is
> enough, to launch the
> XSS.
>
> 2. Phising/Defacement (using HTML Injection). In
> this scenario, the
> attacker is actually using the fact that some site
> is banned, and
> replace the page content with a forged page.
> Example:
>
http://BannedSite.com/<HTML>forged_page_content_in_here</HTML>
>
> The client will think that he is in the requested
> site (the browser will
> also indicate that),but in fact he will see the
> forged content - sounds
> to me like defacement and/or phishing.
> Think about a banned bank web site, in which the
> attacker will replace
> the login page and send the credentials to him.
>
> There are more scenarios, but I think that this is
> bad enough.
> Best regards,
> Erez.
>
> ________________________________
>
>
> Erez Metula, CISSP
> Application Security Department Manager
> Security Software Engineer
> E-Mail: erezmetula@...ecure.co.il Mobile:
> 972-54-2108830
> Office: 972-39007530
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brian Eaton [mailto:eaton.lists@...il.com]
> Sent: Monday, July 10, 2006 2:06 PM
> To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
> Cc: Erez Metula
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] MIMESweeper For Web
> 5.X Cross Site
> Scripting
>
> On 7/9/06, Erez Metula <erezmetula@...ecure.co.il>
> wrote:
> > An example attack scenario could be that an
> attacker will redirect
> many
> > users (by email, posting in the organization
> portal, etc.) to some
> blocked
> > URL and an accompanying script that will steal
> their authentication
> cookies.
>
> It sounds like the net impact of this vulnerability
> is that an
> attacker can steal cookies for a site the user isn't
> allowed to visit
> anyway. In other words, there aren't going to be
> any interesting
> cookies to steal. Is there more to this attack
> scenario?
>
> Regards,
> Brian
>
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