full-disclosure - ScatterChat Advisory 2006-01: Cryptanalytic Attack Vulnerability

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Message-ID: <61748.65.37.85.220.1155306318.squirrel@webmail.korax.net>
Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2006 10:25:18 -0400 (EDT)
From: "ScatterChat Advisories" <sc_advisories@...ktivismo.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: ScatterChat Advisory 2006-01: Cryptanalytic
	Attack Vulnerability

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ScatterChat Advisory 2006-01:  Cryptanalytic Attack Vulnerability
Technical Report
CVE ID: CVE-2006-4021
August 11th, 2006
http://www.scatterchat.com/



SUMMARY

ScatterChat (http://www.scatterchat.com/) is an instant messaging project
that aims to provide encryption and anonymity support with Tor to
non-technical users such as human rights activists and political
dissidents.

Steven Murdoch, a security researcher with the University of Cambridge,
discovered a theoretical weakness in ScatterChat's cryptographic module.
He found that an eavesdropper might locate patterns in a private
communications channel if extraordinarily large amounts of messages were
exchanged in a single conversation.

Note that this does not allow an eavesdropper to decrypt messages, nor
determine a user's identity if anonymity is used.

The practical impact of this vulnerability is very low.



DETAILS

It was found that the birthday attack could be used against the
custom padding mechanism on the ECB-mode encryption of messages.

After 114KB of data is sent in a single conversation the probability
of a collision between two 16-byte blocks is 1% and will reach 50%
after 904KB, then 99% after 2.3MB (approximately).  Note that
conversations are reset when one or both peers sign off from the
instant messaging service.

The above figures are calculated assuming that messages do not
contain any entropy, which is unrealistic for an instant messaging
environment.  Assuming a rate of one bit of entropy per character,
the probability of a collision is 1% after 580KB is exchanged and
will reach 50% after 4,822KB, then 99% after 12,431KB (approximately).

Note that if each instant message was filled to its 500-byte capacity
(as enforced by the system), then 580KB would be transfered after
1,188 messages.



IMPACT

The end-user impact of this issue is very low.

It is important to note that this issue does NOT allow an eavesdropper
to decrypt any messages, nor does it allow them to discover the user's
identity if the anonymity feature is used.

In general, this type of cryptanalytic attack allows an eavesdropper to
determine patterns in an encrypted conversation, which in theory could
yield information about messages if enough patterns were found and
correlated.  However, this issue only allows two 16-byte segments to be
matched with 1% probability when at least 1,188 instant messages are
exchanged in a single, uninterrupted session.  In most cases, more than
1,188 instant messages would need to be sent.

The information leaked in the above situation would be negligible.

This issue also affects any application that is built upon ScatterChat's
encryption module.

Note that secure file transfers are not affected.



SOLUTION

The ScatterChat project takes both practical and theoretical
vulnerabilities very seriously.  However, due to the low impact of this
vulnerability, and the high risk of introducing other subtle security
problems in updating the protocol, this issue will not be fixed in the
v1.0.x branch.

This issue will be rectified in the v2.0 series, which will replace
the current cryptographic module with the well-tested OTR encryption
module (http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/).  A release date for v2.0
is not yet known.

Optionally, this issue can be mitigated through the use of the anonymity
feature, as traffic analysis often requires a known context to make
sense of patterns.  Without the knowledge of who is communicating,
an eavesdropper's attempts at interpreting patterns can be frustrated.

ScatterChat v1.0.x remains safe to use in the overwhelming majority of
cases.  However, for high risk, non-technical users, i.e., users operating
behind national firewalls, we recommend extra caution.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A special thanks goes out to Steven Murdoch for his professionalism in
dealing with this matter.  His web page can be found at:
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/sjm217/



CONTACT

J. Salvatore Testa II
jtesta--at--hacktivismo--dot--com

http://www.scatterchat.com/jtesta_2006.asc
3428 E58E 715E C37D 2AA7 C55E 97D1 DE8C 4B26 2B62


- ----
A less technical summary of this advisory can be found at:
http://www.scatterchat.com/advisories/2006-01_non_tech.html



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