full-disclosure - Re: RealVNC 4.1.2 minor heap corruption/DoS vulnerability (authentication required)

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <22356072.58821156117300128.JavaMail.juha-matti.laurio@netti.fi>
Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 02:41:39 +0300 (EEST)
From: Juha-Matti Laurio <juha-matti.laurio@...ti.fi>
To: Niall FitzGibbon <fitzgibbon@...eyonder.co.uk>, 
	full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Cc: 
Subject: Re: RealVNC 4.1.2 minor heap corruption/DoS
	vulnerability (authentication required)

They probably will post patch information here:
http://www.realvnc.com/pipermail/vnc-announce/2006/date.html

- Juha-Matti


Niall FitzGibbon <fitzgibbon@...eyonder.co.uk> wrote: 
> 
> This vulnerability affects the latest version of RealVNC (4.1.2) on all 
> platforms.  It is tested on Windows.
> 
> To exploit the vulnerability, the attacker must either control a connected and 
> authenticated client connected to a vulnerable VNC server or control a VNC 
> server with at least one vulnerable connected and authenticated client.
> 
> The attack exploits a signed/unsigned integer mismatch leading to an integer 
> overflow and subsequent allocation of very large or zero size areas on the 
> heap.  The result of the attack is Denial of Service due to heap corruption 
> and improper program flow.  It doesn't seem possible to exploit the heap 
> corruption in order to gain code execution the source of the copy operation 
> is not defined by the attacker.  The attack is thus of limited usefulness due 
> to the necessity of prior authentication.
> 
> The vulnerability lies in the following functions:
> rfb/SMsgReader.cxx : readClientCutText()
> rfb/CMsgReader.cxx : readServerCutText()
> 
> These functions handle clipboard changes propagated from the other party.  The 
> simplest way to trigger this vulnerability is to modify the 
> CMsgWriter::clientCutText or SMsgWriter::writeServerCutText in order to send 
> an integer length of -1 on clipboard updates.  This results in an allocation 
> of zero bytes to the heap on the other party and subsequent write of a zero 
> terminator to an address immediately before the allocated zero-length buffer 
> followed by a large memcpy to that buffer.  When an exception is finally 
> thrown, RealVNC handles this by terminating the connection and possibly the 
> process, throwing an error message about the message type.
> 
> Reported to vendor (v4bugs@...lvnc.com) 01 August 2006.  No response at time 
> of writing.
> 

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/