full-disclosure - Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20060910202753.GA17470@eltex.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 00:27:53 +0400
From: ArkanoiD <ark@...ex.net>
To: 3APA3A <3APA3A@...URITY.NNOV.RU>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: RSA SecurID SID800 Token vulnerable by design

nuqneH,

Well, they could have a hardware button on the token itself at least..

On Sat, Sep 09, 2006 at 01:41:55PM +0400, 3APA3A wrote:
> Dear Hadmut Danisch,
> 
>  2-factor authentication is not a way to protect against malware.
> 
>  SecurID  authentication  supports  single sign-on technology. As a weak
>  side  of  this  technology,  it means, if single account on any network
>  host  is  compromised,  this  account  is compromised in whole network,
>  because  any resource can be accessed from compromised host. An ability
>  to read current key from device is required to support single sign-on.
> 
>  The  only  additional  attack factor this issue creates is attacker can
>  get  _physical_  access  to  console with user's credentials _any time_
>  while  user is logged in, while in case token can not be red (e.g. it's
>  not plugged to USB) he can only access console short after user logs in
>  to compromised host (while token is not changed).
> 
> 
> --Thursday, September 7, 2006, 10:49:52 PM, you wrote to full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk:
> 
> 
> HD> However, if the Token Code can be read over the USB bus, this
> HD> assumption does not hold. A single attack on the PC where the token is
> HD> plugged in would compromise both the PIN (e.g. with a keylogger) and
> HD> the token itself (e.g. writing a daemon which continuously polls the
> HD> token and forwards the token in real time to a remote attacker.
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> ~/ZARAZA
> http://www.security.nnov.ru/

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/